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 ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I explore the determinants and intrahousehold allocation of nutrition in 
pastoralist households in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia.  Little economic 
research has been done on pastoralist households, especially on these topics.  This 
work helps to fill that void, while also testing some of the common assumptions made 
in modeling the relationship between nutrition and income more generally.  In Chapter 
1 I review some of the literature that provides background or motivation to the 
questions of this thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2, I explore the nutrition-income relationship for pastoralist households in 
East Africa.  Previous estimates of income elasticities of nutritional demand have 
ranged from zero to close to unity.  However, these estimates are always based on 
nutrition’s relationship with total income.  One possible explanation for this wide 
range is that nutrition may respond differently to different sources of income if, for 
example, agents engage in “mental accounting”, the practice of treating distinct 
income sources as not fully fungible.  Estimating income-nutrition elasticities with 
total income may mask these differential responses and result in very different income 
elasticity estimates depending on which income source changes.  I find that 
differential nutritional responses across income sources do exist among the pastoralist 
households studied.  Possible explanations for this result are market failures for certain 
commodities, intrahousehold bargaining and mental accounting.  Tests show that 
neither markets failures nor intrahousehold bargaining fully account for the 
differential responses observed.  Thus it appears that mental accounting indeed plays 
some part in explaining the nutritional patterns evident in this sample. 
 
 
  
 
In Chapter 3, I explore intrahousehold nutritional allocation in the pastoralist 
households studied.  A number of previous studies have compared income or price 
elasticities of resource allocation across demographic cohorts as a way of inferring 
intrahousehold welfare disparities (or the lack thereof).  However, elasticities have 
very different welfare implications depending on the direction of income or price 
changes and thus cannot be used to make definitive welfare comparisons.  To control 
for this problem I estimate cohort-specific income elasticities separately for when 
income is below or above the household’s intertemporal mean income.  Statistical tests 
show that individuals do exhibit asymmetric responses to changes in above- and 
below-mean income.  Furthermore, I find that household heads appear to 
disproportionately bear the nutritional burden when household income is below its 
mean while other household members appear to disproportionately enjoy nutritional 
gains when household income is above its mean.  Stochastic dominance tests on 
simulated cohort-specific nutritional distributions show that adult daughters are 
systematically better of than other household members, sons are systematically worse 
off, and there seems to be little difference between male household heads and their 
wives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The field of development economics is largely devoted to exploring ways of 
combating poverty, along with its many adverse effects.  In countries at all levels of 
development, the food insecurity and low nutrient-intake of the poor have occupied a 
central place in the study of poverty.  Income generation programs and food pricing 
policies have been some of the primary tools used by policymakers and development 
practitioners to combat hunger and malnutrition in poor households.  However, these 
efforts have met with mixed and often disappointing results.  Some argue that the 
failings of these programs and policies are because of mistargeting due to a need to 
better understand the relationship between nutrition and income (Behrman and 
Deolalikar, 1987, Bouis and Haddad, 1992, Strauss and Thomas, 1990) as well as the 
dynamics that govern the intrahousehold allocation of food resources (Behrman and 
Deolalikar, 1990, Deaton, 1997, Strauss and Thomas, 1995). 
 Until recent decades, it was generally thought that the most effective way to 
combat hunger and malnutrition was through economic growth and, more specifically, 
raising the incomes of the poor.  Conventional wisdom has held that while nutrient 
intakes may not rise one for one with income, the elasticity of nutrient demand with 
respect to income is still substantially greater than zero.  In the last few decades, 
however, some studies have emerged arguing that the income elasticity of nutrient 
demand is instead close to zero, meaning that increases in income will not produce 
substantial improvements in nutritional well-being (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990, 
Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987, Behrman et al., 1988, Bouis, 1994, Bouis and Haddad, 
1992).  If this claim holds true then it has significant implications about how 
economist and policymakers think about food, poverty and development. 
1 
 The debate over the nutrition-income relationship, however, is far from over.  
It is still widely believed that among the very poor, there are substantial food intake 
responses to changes in income and wealth.1  Within the framework of this debate, 
though, there are some important considerations to be noted.  Many studies focus 
intensely on changes in caloric intake (as a measure of nutritional well-being) in 
response to changes in determining factors such as prices or income.  This 
characterization has gotten to the point that now debates are framed as over the 
calorie-income relationship rather than the nutrition-income relationship.  Measuring 
calorie consumption began as a way of inferring nutritional status and food intake, 
whereas now it has virtually become the definition of nutritional status and food 
intake.  Thus, the concern over undernutrition has been replaced by a concern over the 
intake of specific nutrients, most commonly, calories.  While meeting energy 
requirements is certainly an essential element of a nutritious diet, it does not capture 
the whole picture.  The debate must be re-oriented back to how determining factors 
impact individual and household nutritional well-being, of which caloric intake is but 
one part. 
 Additionally, practitioners working to better understand nutritional 
determinants must also reconsider how they think about household and individual food 
expenditure.  Classical economic theory states that an income increase of any kind 
would elicit the same response in expenditure behavior, meaning that income 
elasticities on various expenditure activities are assumed to be identical across income 
sources.  This implies that spending on food, electricity, clothing, entertainment, 
etc…would respond similarly to an increase in income, whether that income increase 
was due to extra hours worked or whether it came as a Christmas gift from Grandma.  
However, there is a large body of literature supporting the idea of mental accounting, 
                                                 
1 For a good discussion of this debate and literature see Strauss and Thomas (1995). 
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of which one component proposes that where income comes from affects how it is 
spent.2  In other words, changes in different sources of income may impact 
expenditure shares and activities differently.  So in the context of the nutrition-income 
debate, instead of simply looking at nutritional responses to changes in total income, it 
might be more appropriate to ask from where does income allocated to households’ 
food expenditures come and what are their nutritional responses to changes in 
different income components. 
 For those concerned with malnutrition and hunger, it is not only important to 
understand how various factors affect household nutritional well-being, but also how 
resource allocation behaviors within the household affect individual nutritional well-
being.  Nutritional well-being is an individual, not household, characteristic.  While 
household members might (or might not) suffer and prosper together, hunger and 
malnutrition is an individual experience.  The household, though, is probably the most 
prominent institution determining the welfare of its individual members.  
Development practitioners and policymakers, therefore, cannot be indifferent to 
intrahousehold processes of resource allocation. 
 There has been much discussion and debate concerning what are the primary 
determinants of nutritional well-being and whether intrahousehold processes of 
resource allocation favor certain demographic groups over others.  Section II of this 
chapter reviews the literature on the relationship between nutrition and income.  
Section III looks at dietary diversity as a potential indicator of dietary quality and food 
security.  Section IV reviews the evidence and literature on mental accounting and the 
possible role it plays in food consumption behavior.  Section V examines evidence on 
intrahousehold processes of resource allocation.  Finally, Section VI reviews the 
                                                 
2 For a good discussion of mental accounting and a review of the literature on it see Thaler (1999). 
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literature on the nutritional dynamics of pastoralist households in Africa.  Section VII 
concludes. 
 
I.  The Relationship between Nutrition and Income 
 Conventional wisdom holds that the low nutrient intake of the poor is, in a 
large part, due to low income.  Substantial resources therefore have been devoted to 
income growth programs aimed at improving nutrition in poor communities.  
However, despite many studies on the subject, there is little agreement over the extent 
to which the nutritional status of the poor responds to changes in their income.  
Studies examining this matter often look at intake changes of specific nutrients, 
particularly calories, in relation to changes in some measure of income.  The debate 
over this relationship ranges from studies arguing that the calorie-income curve is 
essentially flat (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990, Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987, Bouis 
1994, Bouis and Haddad, 1992, Wolfe and Behrman, 1983) to the other extreme where 
studies have estimated the income elasticity of demand for calories to be close to one 
(Pitt, 1983, Strauss, 1984).  Other studies find a concave or elbow-shaped calorie-
income curve (Ravallion, 1990, Strauss and Thomas, 1995, Strauss and Thomas, 1990, 
Subramanian and Deaton, 1996).  These latter findings indicate that among the very 
poor, nutrient intakes would increase with income up to a certain level, after which the 
nutrient-income elasticity would decline, possible to zero. 
 Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) contend that even among the very poor, the 
income elasticity of caloric demand is not significantly different from zero.  
Consequently, substantial nutrient improvements would not automatically follow 
income increases in the process of development.  They argue that previous studies 
reporting high nutrient elasticities may have overestimated those parameters due to 
confusion between income elasticities of food expenditure and income elasticities of 
4 
nutrient intake.  Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) claim that most of these studies 
estimated nutrient elasticities using food expenditure systems for a small number of 
food aggregates.  Assuming that nutrient and food elasticities are equal at the level of 
aggregation, constant nutrient-to-food conversions were used to transform food 
elasticities to nutrient elasticities.  This method assumes that within each food group, 
there is no substitution away from cheaper calories to more expensive ones.  Thus, 
Behrman and Deolalikar argue the nutrient elasticities measured by the expenditure 
system at the level of aggregation are upwardly biased estimates. 
 To demonstrate this, they show the elasticity of nutrient intake with respect to 
expenditure as 
 
  qiEiEiEinE   
 
where XY is the elasticity of X with respect to Y, n is the quantity of a particular 
nutrient consumed (such as calories), i is the share of total nutrients consumed from a 
particular food i, E is the total food expenditure, Ei is expenditure on food i, and qi is 
the average cost of the nutrient obtained from food i.  Behrman and Deolalikar note 
that indirect expenditure system estimates often assume that  qiEi  equals zero.  
However, this may not be the case.  The authors contend that even at low incomes, 
households give considerable weight to food attributes other than nutrient content 
when making their food consumption decisions.  These attributes include 
characteristics such as quality, aroma, variety and taste.  They point out that if 
 is indeed positive, then the weighted sum of food expenditure elasticities 
with respect to total expenditure would overstate the nutrient elasticity with respect to 
food expenditure.  Thus, Behrman and Deolalikar believe that high food expenditure 
elasticities may still be consistent with low nutrient elasticities.  They propose that 
 qiEi
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direct estimates of nutrient consumption based on more detailed food data would 
avoid this aggregation bias and garner elasticity estimates closer to their true value.  
Consistent with that belief, in a study of rural households in Southern India, they 
found a high food expenditure elasticity of 1.18 along with a nutrient elasticity of 0.37 
that was not significantly different from zero. 
 In another study, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) explore whether nutrient 
elasticities would be higher with respect to permanent rather than current income.  
They postulate that households would likely want to protect their nutrient intake from 
short-term income fluctuations to a greater extent than they would from fluctuations in 
their long-term income.  Using the same data they used for their 1989 study, they 
estimated the effects of both current and permanent income on caloric intake.  They 
found both of these effects to be not significantly different from zero.  Instead, they 
found relatively strong nutrient consumption responses to changes in food prices—
many of which were positive.  They claim that the high price elasticities of nutrient 
demand support their theory that households do not consume at a minimum cost diet.  
Rather, as household income increases, they substitute away from cheaper nutrients to 
more expensive one.  Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) also find that what they call 
village-level characteristics—village population, average female wage and average 
male wage—are strong determinants of nutrient intake.  They suggest that this could 
be indicative of the availability and quality of infrastructure and public services.  
These, the authors argue, may be more important in raising individual nutrient intakes 
than income-generating programs. 
 Bouis and Haddad (1992) also examine the relationship between the magnitude 
of the calorie-income/expenditure elasticity and the method of estimation and data 
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collection.  The authors highlight the importance of wastages and leakages3 that are 
often unobserved by common data collection methods and that can potentially cause 
substantial upward bias in estimates.  They also point out that if expenditure data is 
used to both estimate total expenditure (as an inference for income on the right-hand 
side of the equation) and food expenditure (as an inference of caloric availability on 
the left-hand side of the equation), there will likely be correlated measurement errors 
for the nutrition dependent variable and the expenditure explanatory variable.  In other 
words, if an individual overestimates (underestimates) total expenditure then food 
expenditure will also likely be overestimated (underestimated).  Since it is often the 
case that poor households will overestimate expenditure and rich households will 
underestimate expenditure, nutrient-income elasticities using those data will be 
upwardly biased. 
 Bouis and Haddad (1992) investigate different ways of measuring and 
estimating the calorie-income relationship and how each method might bias the 
estimated elasticity.  They propose that biases resulting from estimation techniques 
and correlated measurement errors from common data collection methods may be of 
more importance than the aggregation bias discussed by Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1987).  To explore they this estimate elasticities for four different combinations of 
nutrient intake and income measurements:  caloric availability4 (minus leakages) with 
total expenditures, caloric intake with total expenditures, caloric availability (minus 
leakages) with income, and caloric intake with income.  The OLS estimates of the four 
elasticities range from as low as 0.03 to as high as 0.43.  Bouis and Haddad reason that 
the caloric intake with total expenditure pair to be the most appropriate and least 
                                                 
3 Wastages and leakages in this case is the difference between a household’s food purchases and its 
food intake.  This difference may come from things such as feeding guests and plate waste. 
4 Caloric availability is measured from food expenditures, this indicating the amount of calories 
available to be consumed based on food purchases. 
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biased variable pair to use when exploring the relationship between income and 
calorie consumption.  The authors also report elasticity estimates for the four variable 
pairs using four different estimators:  OLS, instrumental variables, fixed effects, and 
Hausman-Taylor random effects.  From the four different estimation techniques used 
by the authors, the estimated elasticities using their preferred variable pair ranged from 
0.08 to 0.14.  The authors argue that these are their best estimates. 
 Bouis and Haddad further contend that elasticities based on caloric intake, 
garnered from a 24-hour food intake recall, tend to be considerably lower than those 
based on caloric availability.  According to them, this is because the availability data 
fail to account for food transfers into and out of the household.  Yet, not only do 
guests and workers in their data consume just a small percentage of the food, the 
authors also accounted for food transfers in their calculation of net caloric availability.  
Consequently, the bias resulting from food transfers should, for the most part, be taken 
care of.  The estimates using net caloric availability range from 0.28 to 0.59.  The 
authors claim that these estimates nonetheless remain upwardly biased because other 
leakages continue to be important.  While this might be true, they provide no statistical 
basis for this assertion  (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). 
 Bouis and Haddad (1992) explain that their preferred elasticity estimate is so 
low because many of the properties that might have caused their other estimates to be 
upwardly biased are taken care of.  While that may be true, there may be another 
reason for the low magnitude of their preferred elasticity.  A number of studies have 
found a concave relationship between nutrient intake and income/expenditure 
(Ravallion, 1990, Strauss and Thomas, 1995, Strauss and Thomas, 1990, Subramanian 
and Deaton, 1996).  These studies have presented empirical evidence showing that 
caloric responses to income are considerable stronger at low levels of income than 
they are at high ones. 
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 Intuitively, this makes sense.  If incomes are rising with calories, as an 
individual gets closer to meeting his caloric needs, his demand for calories will 
become less elastic because non-nutritive attributes to food and non-food demands 
will gain more prominence in his consumption decisions.  In the data used by Bouis 
and Haddad, the mean caloric intake of individuals in the lowest income groups is 
2,2265, which is close to the standard recommendations for the daily calorie 
requirement of adults6 (USDA, 2008).  In fact, in a non-parametric analysis of the 
same data set used by Bouis and Haddad (1992), Strauss and Thomas (1995) find clear 
non-linearities in the relationship between caloric consumption and expenditure.  In 
this analysis, caloric intake and expenditure are positively correlated at low levels of 
income and calorie consumption.  However, when per capita caloric consumption 
reaches around 2,000 calories per day, the curve flattens out.  Thus, it is possible that 
the low calorie-expenditure elasticity observed by Bouis and Haddad arises because 
individuals in the study are for the most part on the flatter portion of the calorie-
expenditure curve.  At this point, individuals may be responding more to other nutrient 
needs, non-nutritive food attributes, and are buying more expensive calories.  It is 
important to note that while individuals in this sample might have adequate or at least 
close to adequate caloric intake, this does not mean that their diets are sufficiently 
nutritious.  Additionally, because the calorie-expenditure elasticity estimated is low 
does not mean that increases in income will not enhance the nutritional quality of their 
diet.  This only means that individuals will not necessarily consume substantially more 
calories with increases in income.  Their diets could still benefit as they diversify their 
                                                 
5 The average caloric availability for adults in the lowest income groups of the data was 2,170. 
6 According to the USDA Food and Nutrition Information Center, the daily caloric requirement for a 
male adult with BMI of 18.5 kg/m2 ranges from 1.848 (with activity level of sedentary) to 2,554 (for 
very active) an adult female of the same BMI ranges from 1,625 to 2,291.  For a BMI of 24.99 kg/m2 
the range is from 2,080 to 2,898 for males and 1,762 to 2,489 for females. 
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diets and improve micronutrient consumption with increased incomes.  Energy intake 
is but one aspect, albeit an essential one, of an adequate diet. 
 In a later study, Bouis and Haddad (1994) further investigate potential biases 
resulting from data collection methods and use bodyweight as a tool to evaluate the 
accuracy of food expenditure and 24-hour recall data.  In this study, they argue that 
caloric intakes and bodyweights across income groups ought to increase or decrease 
proportionately.  The authors further argue that calorie-income/expenditure elasticities 
even as low as 0.2 would lead to exceedingly unrealistic weight increases with 
increases in income.  However, this conclusion not only ignores the existence of the 
non-linear concave relationship between calories and income shown empirically in 
other studies, it also makes rather strong assumptions about the relationship between 
energy intake and bodyweight.  The role played by individual differences such as 
gender, age, weight, activity level and metabolism, in the energy requirement for 
maintaining bodyweight is ignored in this analysis.  Furthermore, Ravallion (1990) 
argued that there also exist multiple intake-expenditure equilibria where bodyweight is 
maintained.  According to this argument, income gains will not only affect energy 
intake, but energy requirements as well. 
 Subramanian and Deaton (1996) also investigate the relationship between 
nutrition and expenditure/income in the Maharashtra state of India.  Because 
Maharashtra includes one of the villages in the data used by Behrman and Deolalikar, 
Subramanian and Deaton believe that comparisons between their results and those of 
Behrman and Deolalikar can be informative.  Although their data set is not a panel, 
Subramanian and Deaton have observations on 5,630 households.  Thus, they note, it 
is possible to estimate the calorie-expenditure elasticity with more precision with their 
data than with that used by Behrman and Deolalikar.  This is an important 
consideration because, they point out, although it is statistically insignificant, Behrman 
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and Deolalikar’s preferred point estimate for the calorie-expenditure elasticity is 0.37, 
which is within range of what conventional wisdom asserts (Greer and Thorbecke, 
1986, Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo, 1978, Reutlinger and Selowsky, 1976, Sahn, 
1988, Strauss and Thomas, 1995, Strauss and Thomas, 1990). 
 Subramanian and Deaton (1996) explore the calorie-expenditure elasticity first 
with non-parametric estimation and then with multivariate regression.  They show that 
even if their estimated elasticity was upwardly biased due to common measurement 
errors, this bias could not explain their results if the true elasticity was in fact close to 
zero.  They also account for some of the potential bias brought to light by Bouis and 
Haddad (1992) by correcting for wastages and leakages. 
 In their analysis, Subramanian and Deaton (1996) find that the expenditure 
elasticity of caloric demand is around 0.55 for the poorest households and decreases 
slowly to 0.40 for the better-off households.  Like Behrman and Deolalikar, the 
authors find that richer households tend to buy more expensive calories than do poorer 
ones.  In fact, those at the top of the income distribution paid almost twice as much for 
calories as those at the bottom.  They find, though, that this is mostly due to 
substitution between food groups rather than within them.  Except for the very poorest 
households, where there was some evidence of quality upgrading in cereals (even 
within course grains), increases in the price per calorie happened much more between 
broad food groups than within them.  The authors note, therefore, that if conversion 
factors were applied to appropriately defined broad food groups, calorie-
income/expenditure elasticities should not be substantially overestimated due to an 
aggregation bias.  Their results show the total expenditure elasticity of food to be 
around 0.75.  They find this figure is, for the most part, equally divided between the 
expenditure elasticity of calories and the expenditure elasticity of the price of calories. 
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 Strauss and Thomas (1990) use parametric and non-parametric techniques to 
investigate the shape of calorie-expenditure curve as well as the functional form 
representing it.  They use a large data set from Brazil, with 53,000 households 
surveyed, which they split up into sub-samples.7  They used one sub-sample for 
exploratory analysis and non-parametric estimation.  They then used these results to 
guide their selection of the functional form for the model.  In another sub-sample they 
used parametric estimation to estimate nutrient-expenditure elasticities and test a 
number of different functional forms for appropriateness.  With the non-parametric 
methods used on the first sub-sample Strauss and Thomas find that the calorie-
expenditure curve is positively sloped for households in the lower three quartiles of 
the per capita expenditure distribution.  The curve is then kinked where per capita 
calorie intake is between 2,500 and 3,000 per day and is flat at higher expenditure 
levels.  Using parametric forms suggested by the non-parametric curves, the authors 
estimate the calorie-expenditure elasticity as 0.26 for the bottom decile of expenditure 
groups and 0.03 for the top decile.  In this analysis, it is apparent that appropriately 
defining the functional form used for estimation is important.  When the form is 
specified as log-linear, the instrumented calorie-expenditure elasticity is 0.12.  
However when taking into account the non-linearities that exist in this relationship, the 
instrumented calorie-expenditure elasticity is between 0.25 and 0.30. 
 In a later work, Strauss and Thomas (1995) again use nonparametric regression 
in order to better understand the nutrient-income relationship and how it changes as 
income/expenditure changes.  Using the same data from Brazil, the ICRISAT data 
used by Behrman and Deolalikar (1987, 1990) from India, and the Bukidnon data used 
by Bouis and Haddad (1992), they present non-parametric estimates of the estimated 
relationships between caloric intake and expenditure.  What is striking in their analysis 
                                                 
7 They use the Estudo Nacional da Despesa Familiar (ENDEF) data set. 
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is the similarity of each of the curves.  For each data set, Strauss and Thomas find that 
caloric intake is indeed positively correlated with expenditure at lower levels of 
expenditure.  However when per capita calorie consumption reaches approximately 
2,000 calories per day, the curves flatten out.  Thus, the calorie-expenditure elasticity 
decreases as expenditure increases.  Furthermore, Strauss and Thomas found that for 
households below median per capita expenditure, the calorie-expenditure elasticity is 
0.29 in the Brazil data, 0.30 (with a standard error of 0.04) in the ICRISAT data, and 
0.33 in the Bukidon data.  These results suggest that there is in fact a positive 
correlation between caloric intake and expenditure among poor households.  It further 
indicates that this correlation declines to close to zero once some threshold of caloric 
intake has been crossed. 
 To further our understanding of food consumption patterns and how they are 
impacted by income and price changes, Sahn (1988) explored the importance of 
disaggregating data by region and income class.  His study found that increases in total 
expenditure accompanied increases in the budget shares of high-quality, protein-rich 
foods.  Over the range of income groups (from lowest to highest) the budget share of 
meat increased by a multiple of four, with the actual quantity of meat consumed 
increasing by almost 17 times.  Additionally, the budget share of milk products 
increased 2.5 times across income groups.  Another finding worth noting was that 
nearly all commodity groups, including staples, were consumed in higher quantities in 
households with higher income.  This is despite the fact that the budget shares for 
these commodities were lower.  Sahn found calorie-expenditure elasticities of 0.76 for 
low-expenditure groups, 0.62 for middle-expenditure groups, and 0.28 for high-
expenditure groups.  These results support the view that the income elasticity of 
calorie demand declines as income increases.  Consequently, Sahn points out that in 
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order to increase the nutritional well-being of the poor, income growth policies must 
focus on the distribution of income growth more than simply its aggregate magnitude. 
Ravallion (1990) points out the distinction between ‘nutrient intake’ and 
‘under-nutrition’.  He explains that under-nutrition is what we are primarily concerned 
with and that it depends on a number of other factors including but not limited to 
nutrient intake.  One of these factors is nutrient requirements, which can vary widely 
among different individuals.  Thus, he notes, a seemingly small difference in nutrient 
intake by two otherwise identical persons can result in substantial differences in the 
severity of the under-nutrition.  Ravallion argues that when assessing the income and 
price effects on nutrient intake and under-nutrition, it is important to define and 
control for nutritional needs in a meaningful way.  While requirement levels have been 
estimated for a few stylized types of individuals, most households will be different 
from those references.  There are many characteristics that are relevant to nutrient 
requirements such as household demographics, type of work performed, and personal 
constitution.  Ravallion contends that although there are certain expenditure-energy 
intake equilibria that are accepted as being able to sustain life, they nonetheless might 
be too low by the normative standards of a particular society.  These accepted 
equilibria might be too low to allow certain basic capabilities and activity levels that 
are necessary for proper participation in society.  Therefore, it is important to gauge 
the adequacy of a diet against the nutritional norm in a particular area or society.  
Then, when thinking about the income effects on under-nutrition, one must look at the 
distribution of nutrient intakes around that norm.  Additionally, there are likely to be 
larger nutritional responses to income shifts for those whose under-nutrition is more 
severe.  Moreover, these responses may be masked if one is only assessing nutritional 
responses at the mean.  Ravallion thus recognizes the non-linearities between nutrition 
and income discussed by Strauss and Thomas (1990, 1995). 
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These points are well illustrated in the Indonesian data set used by Ravallion 
(1990).  The nutrient-expenditure elasticity was estimated as 0.15 at the mean.  
However, the calorie distribution function in this data is rather steep and thus, he 
notes, the income slope of the calorie demand function rises sharply as income falls.  
While the 0.15 elasticity at the mean indicates that a 10% increase in income would 
result in only a 1.5% increase in energy intake at the mean, Ravallion found that 
households consuming less than 1,900 calories per person per day exhibit an calorie-
expenditure elasticity close to unity.  In fact, Ravallion further found that at only one 
half a standard deviation below the mean, the calorie-expenditure elasticity rose to 
0.33.  Thus the apparent concavity is marked. 
There are a few lessons to be learned from the debate over the relationship 
between income and nutrition.  First, one must consider possible biases that might 
arise due to data collection methods, estimation techniques, and how variables are 
being defined.  Second, it clear and reasonable that non-linearities exist in this 
relationship and that they must be accounted for.  Thus an appropriate functional form 
must be used in order to capture these non-linearities.  A simple log-linear functional 
form may not be flexible enough for this task.  Also, if one is concerned with the 
nutrient intakes of those who are undernourished, then one must assess the nutritional 
responses of those below the mean.  Otherwise, evaluations run the risk of making 
assumptions based on information from the behavior of households that are possibly 
adequately nourished instead of those who are undernourished.  Finally, if the 
nutritional well-being of the poor is our primary concern, then assessments cannot be 
made based solely on calorie consumption.  While many studies would evaluate the 
intake of nutrients other than calories, these intakes were still evaluated separately.  If 
one is to know whether or not there are dietary improvements in response to some 
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determining factor, the diet must be considered as a whole.  Individual movements of 
separate nutrient intakes will not capture the movement of the whole diet. 
 
II.  Dietary Diversity as an Alternative Indicator of Dietary Quality 
 While the wide range of estimated nutrient-income/expenditure elasticities can, 
in part, be explained by methodological differences in estimation techniques, many 
comment that the nature and importance of bias in estimation is likely related to the 
way nutrient consumption data are collected and nutrient intake is inferred (Behrman 
and Deolalikar, 1987, Bouis, 1994, Bouis and Haddad, 1992, Strauss and Thomas, 
1995).  One method of inferring nutrient intake is to estimate a measure of nutrient 
availability by looking at food purchases and imputed values based on the portion of 
own production or in-kind wages that is consumed.  However, this may lead to the 
aggregation bias described by Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) and the ‘leakages’ bias 
described by Bouis and Haddad (1992).  Another method is to obtain direct 
quantitative information on nutrient intakes rather than availability.  This is done by 
directly measuring the amount of food consumed and the amount wasted.  While more 
accurate than the nutrient availability measurement, this method is often unrealistic as 
it is rather intensive, requires a higher level of expertise in enumerators, and is very 
expensive.  Another way to collect information on nutrient intakes is through recall 
surveys asking respondents about their meals consumed and the ingredients that went 
into them.  These surveys are often based on a 24-hour recall but have also used longer 
periods such as 3, 7 or 14 days.  Data using 24-hour recalls can pose problems in that 
they can be very noisy due to daily variation in eating habits.  However, longer recalls 
tend to be more inaccurate and have more trouble capturing wastages and leakages 
(Strauss and Thomas, 1995). 
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 Beyond measurement concerns, one must also ask whether or not the variables 
being measured are good indicators of the nutritional quality of diets.  The studies 
discussed in the previous section focus on calorie consumption as an indicator of 
dietary quality.  While adequate caloric intake is certainly essential to a healthy diet, it 
is far from a complete picture.  In their defense, many of these studies also estimated 
elasticities for nutrients other than calories, such as protein.  However, relationships 
were estimated for each of these nutrients separately. 
 So, ultimately, there was still not a clear picture of how explanatory variables 
of interest were affecting overall dietary quality.  Low calorie-income elasticities have 
been used to defend the position that substantial nutritional improvements may not 
necessarily follow increases in income (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987).  Yet, this may 
not be true if individuals are substituting towards foods that although are more 
expensive per calorie, may provide other nutrients that are at that point marginally 
more valuable to the diet and the consumer’s health.  However, this is hard to assess if 
each nutrient is examined separately.  If the nutritional quality of diets is to be 
assessed, diets must be examined as a whole. 
 Nutritionists have long recognized this issue and often use more encompassing 
measures of dietary quality.  Methods that have been widely applied include the 
nutrient adequacy ratio (NAR) and the mean adequacy ratio (MAR) to gauge nutrient 
adequacy.  The NAR is the ratio of an individual’s nutrient intake to the recommended 
daily allowance (RDA) for that individual.  The MAR gives a measure of overall 
nutrient adequacy by summing the NAR for each nutrient and then dividing that sum 
by the total number of nutrients.  Each NAR calculated is usually truncated at 100% of 
the RDA in order to avoid excess consumption of certain nutrients compensating for 
low consumption of other nutrients in the resultant MAR (Ruel, 2002, Ruel, 2003).  
Measurements such as this give a fuller picture of dietary quality than does 
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investigating the intake of various nutrients separately.  However, this method still 
requires that the researcher find an adequate way of measuring the intake of nutrients 
and is thus susceptible to all of the same technical problems mentioned above. 
 In addition to the issues that have been discussed thus far concerning 
inferences of nutrient intakes, one must also consider the variation in nutritional 
quality and composition that exists even within like foods.  For example, two 
individuals that consume equal amounts of maize do not necessarily consume the 
same quantity and quality of nutrients.  The nutrient content of food varies depending 
on its variety, how it is grown/raised (i.e. soil nutrient content), how it is prepared, the 
length of time between harvest and consumption, how it is stored after harvest, and a 
host of other conditions. 
 In reaction to the time consuming, expensive nature of conventional methods, 
as well as their large room for measurement error, dietary diversity has been examined 
as a potential alternative indicator of food security and dietary quality (Hatloy, et al., 
1998, Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002, Ogle, et al., 2001, Ruel, 2002, Ruel, 2003, 
Torheim, et al., 2004).  Dietary diversity is usually defined as either the number of 
food groups or the number of unique food and drink items consumed over a given 
period of time. Lack of dietary diversity is especially problematic in poor communities 
in developing countries.  In these communities diets rely heavily on starchy staples 
and often include little to no animal products and limited fresh fruits and vegetables.  
Through improved micronutrient intake, a diverse diet has long been associated with 
enhanced nutritional status.  Indeed, a number of studies have come out recently 
showing dietary diversity to be highly correlated with dietary quality and nutrient 
adequacy (Arimond and Ruel, 2004, Hatloy, et al., 1998, Hoddinott and Yohannes, 
2002, Ogle, et al., 2001, Onyango, et al., 1998, Torheim, et al., 2004).  Studies have 
also found a consistent and positive association between child growth and dietary 
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diversity (Arimond and Ruel, 2004, Onyango, et al., 1998).   Dietary diversity is 
unlikely to suffer from the same measurement errors and thus bias problems that have 
been problematic in many of the more conventional measures of nutritional status.  
Moreover, respondents find questions on dietary diversity relatively simple and 
undemanding on time or memory to answer (Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002).  
Consequently, dietary diversity has been proposed as a promising alternative indicator 
of food security and nutrient adequacy. 
 In a study conducted in Mali, Hatloy et al. (1998) examined the predictive 
ability of dietary diversity for the nutritional adequacy of diets.  The authors compiled 
two dietary diversity scores—a food variety score (FVS), which was based on a 
simple count of unique foods consumed, and a dietary diversity score (DDS), which 
was a food group count based on 8 different food groups.  These measures were then 
validated against NAR and MAR measures for 10 different nutrients.8  Hatloy et al. 
found that MAR is significantly correlated with both measures of dietary diversity.  
They report Pearson’s correlation coefficients between MAR and FVS and DDS of 
0.33 and 0.39, respectively.  They further found that both dietary diversity indicators 
were especially associated with greater intakes of fat energy and higher densities of 
vitamin A and vitamin C in the diet.  The authors conclude that dietary diversity 
scores are fairly good predictors of nutrient adequacy, especially when both dietary 
diversity scores are assessed together. 
 Ogle et al. (2001) note that conventional measures of nutritional well-being 
have difficulty capturing the contributions of local wild foods to diets, which are 
consumed in many rural areas of developing countries.  These foods are often site 
specific, vary with ethnicity, and data on their composition is generally missing or 
                                                 
8 The nutrients included in the measures for NAR and MAR were energy (calories), fat energy 
percentage, protein, iron, riboflavin, niacin, vitamin C, calcium, folic acid, and vitamin A. 
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outdated (Ogle, et al., 2001).  Because of these problems the authors recognize that 
dietary diversity analysis presents a potentially useful tool in assessing diets, in which 
local foods are commonplace.  Using a 7-day recall, Ogle et al. measured both FVS 
and DDS against the nutrient intakes of 11 major nutrients for women in Vietnam.  
Their findings confirmed a positive association between both measures of dietary 
diversity and nutrient intake.  More specifically, they found that women in the highest 
FVS and DDS tercile had significantly higher intakes of most of the nutrients studied 
than did those in the lowest tercile.9  They further found that women, who consumed 8 
or more different food groups over the recall period, had significantly higher nutrient 
adequacy ratios for protein, energy, zinc, niacin, and vitamin C.  Additionally, women 
in the highest tercile consumed a greater percentage of their energy from fat and 
protein and a smaller portion of their energy in the form of carbohydrates.  Similar to 
Hatloy et al., they also found that in one of the regions studied, micronutrient density 
was significantly higher, especially for vitamin C and vitamin A, in the highest dietary 
diversity tercile than in the lowest.  Ogle et al. also noted that the dietary diversity 
scores were able to capture the role of wild foods in the diets of these women. 
 Torheim et al. (2004) also examined the association between dietary diversity 
and nutrient adequacy in Mali.  Like Hatloy et al. (1998) the study validated measures 
of DDS and FVS against mean adequacy ratio.10  The authors also assessed possible 
determinants for the three dietary indexes—MAR, FVS, and DDS.  The determinants 
they investigated were individual characteristics such as age sex, education, and 
illness, as well as household and demographic factors.  Their analysis showed that 
MAR was significantly associated with both FVS and DDS with Pearson’s correlation 
                                                 
9 Women in the highest tercile consumed 21 or more different foods on average over a 7-day recall 
period and women in the lowest tercile consumed 15 or less different foods on average over the 7-day 
recall period. 
10 MAR was calculated in this study from the NAR of energy intake and nine different nutrients. 
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coefficients of 0.34 and 0.30, respectively.  FVS and DDS were also positively 
correlated with energy intake with Pearson’s correlation coefficients of 0.38 and 0.29, 
respectively.  In a linear regression, both FVS and DDS were significant explanatory 
variables for MAR.  The authors conclude that the results from this study confirm that 
dietary diversity can be used as valid indicators of nutrient adequacy. 
 In a study of rural Kenyan toddlers, Onyango et al. (1998) examine the 
relationship between anthropometric measures with prolonged breastfeeding, the 
diversity of foods used during weaning, and the timing of the introduction of 
complementary foods during breastfeeding.  The anthropometric measures assessed 
were a weight for age (WA) Z-score, a height for age (HA) Z-score, a weight for 
height (WH) Z-score, triceps skinfold and mid-upper arm circumference.  Results 
from regression analysis showed that dietary diversity was consistently and positively 
associated with each of the anthropometric measures.  Dietary diversity also played a 
significant role in the adequacy of mean nutrient intakes for children.  In fact, the 
authors found that among partially breast-fed children, nutrient intakes were 20% to 
more than 50% higher for children with high dietary diversity than with low dietary 
diversity.  This study highlights the importance of dietary diversity in the nutritional 
status of weaning-age children. 
 Through multivariate analysis, Arimond and Ruel (2004) explored whether 
dietary diversity was significantly associated with nutritional status independent of 
socioeconomic status.  They study 11 different countries11 with widely varying dietary 
practices and focus on infants and young children aged 6 to 23 months.  The authors 
found that in bivariate analysis there were significant associations between dietary 
diversity terciles and HA Z-score for 9 of the 11 countries studied.12  The multivariate 
                                                 
11 The countries analysis in this study were Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, 
Cambodia, Nepal, Colombia, Haiti, and Peru. 
12 The two countries where the bivariate relationship was not significant were Benin and Cambodia. 
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analysis controlled for child, maternal, and household factors when examining the 
relationship between dietary diversity and HA Z-score.  The results from this analysis 
showed dietary diversity as statistically significant.  Indeed, dietary diversity was the 
main determinant for HA Z-score in 7 of the countries studied.13  Dietary diversity 
also significantly interacted with selected characteristics, such as child age and breast-
feeding status, in a number of countries, including 3 of the 4 countries where dietary 
diversity was not significant as a determinant by itself.  Dietary diversity was a 
stronger determinant of HA Z-score among children who were no longer breast-fed.  
Differences in the magnitudes of the effects of dietary diversity on HA Z-score may be 
due to variation in local diet patterns.  In some areas there may be less nutritionally 
important variation in foods.  There also may be cases where many food groups are 
given but in small quantities making the dietary diversity scores less meaningful 
(Arimond and Ruel, 2004).  Their analysis confirmed a general association between 
dietary diversity and child nutritional status even when controlling for household 
wealth and other welfare factors. 
 Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002) rigorously examined dietary diversity as an 
indicator of food security.  They drew data from 10 different countries14 
encompassing poor and middle-income countries, rural and urban sectors, as well as 
data collected in different seasons.  The authors investigate the association of dieta
diversity and traditional measures of food security by looking at contingency tab
receiver-operator curves, correlation coefficients, and linear regressions with the 
traditional measure as the dependent variable and dietary diversity as one of the 
explanatory variables.  The traditional measures they validated dietary diversity 
against were per capita consumption of food and non-food goods, per capita caloric 
ry 
les, 
                                                 
13 Those countries were Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, Nepal, and Cambodia. 
14 The countries included were Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, India, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Mexico, 
Mozambique, and the Philippines. 
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availability, per capita caloric availability from staple foods, and per capita caloric 
availability from nonstaple foods.  Per capita consumption and per capita caloric
availability are indicators of a household’s or individual’s access to food.  Per
caloric availability from nonstaple foods gives more of an indication of dietary 
quality.  The food categories were divided into country-specific basic staples; coun
specific “luxury staples”; vitamin A-rich roots, tubers, vegetables, and fruits; beans, 
soya, and other pulses; dairy; fats; sugars; meat, fish, and eggs; other roots and tube
other fruits; other vegetables; and beverages, spices, and other prod
 
 capita 
try-
rs; 
ucts. 
 Through all of the methods utilized, Hoddinott and Yohannes find a 
consistently strong and positive association between dietary diversity and conventional 
methods of measuring household food security.  More specifically, they find that a 1 
percent increase in dietary diversity is associated with a 1 percent increase in per 
capita consumption, a 0.7 percent increase in household per capita daily caloric 
availability, a 0.5 percent increase in per capita caloric availability from staples, and a 
1.4 percent increase in per capita daily caloric availability from non-staples.  These 
results were consistent throughout the different analysis methods utilized.  They held 
for both rural and urban areas as well as across seasons.  The authors conclude, 
therefore, that dietary diversity can be used as a way to identify food-insecure 
households, track changes in their circumstances, and assess the impact of 
interventions (Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002).  Furthermore, the very high 
association of dietary diversity with caloric availability from non-staples (elasticity of 
1.4) indicates that dietary diversity is an appropriate measure of dietary quality, 
capturing effects beyond simply energy intake. 
 Nutritionists have long recognized dietary diversity as an essential part of a 
quality diet.  Lack of dietary diversity can be particularly acute among the poor in 
developing countries where their diets are heavily dependent on starchy staples.  Thus, 
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through improved macro- and micro-nutrient access, a more varied diet is associated 
with better nutrition.  Studies in developing countries have consistently found a 
positive association between dietary diversity and nutritional status.  A more varied 
diet has been associated with increased intakes of energy, fat, protein, carbohydrates, 
and a number of vitamins and minerals.  Previous methods of measuring nutritional 
well-being have been either too prone to measurement error and bias, or are too time 
consuming and expensive to be feasible and cost-effective for most field studies.  
Dietary diversity has shown promise as a simple, low-cost alternative to these 
measures.  For these reasons, dietary diversity is used as the measure of dietary quality 
for households studied in the following two chapters. 
  
III.  Mental Accounting in a Development Context 
 The existence of mental accounting is well documented in consumer behavior 
in developed countries (Thaler, 1999).  Mental accounting provides an explanation for 
the many ways in which people’s consumption behavior runs counter to standard 
economic theory.  One component of mental accounting is that income is not perfectly 
fungible, as standard economic theory assumes.  Instead, people may assign certain 
expenditure activities, implicitly or explicitly, to specific ‘mental’ accounts funded by 
different sources of income.  Thus, mental accounting violates the economic notion of 
perfect fungibility.  In other words, changes in income and wealth in one mental 
account, such as a windfall, are not perfect substitutes for income changes in another 
account, such as regular wages (Thaler, 1999).  For example, if someone were to 
receive money as a birthday gift, he may be more likely to spend it on a luxury good 
such as a music player or a nice bottle of scotch, items he would otherwise not buy.  
However, if that same income increase were to be distributed over his regular wages, 
it may be much more likely to be spent on something like paying rent.  In both cases 
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the increase in total income is the same, but the effects on expenditure activities are 
very different, depending on the source of the extra increments of income. 
 One study found that people tend to match the perceived seriousness of an 
expense with the perceived seriousness of the income source.  Funds received from 
more “frivolous” sources, such as office pools, will be spent on more “frivolous” 
expenses, such as eating out.  On the other hand, funds received from more “serious” 
sources would be spent on more “serious” expenses such as paying the bills (O’Curry, 
1997). 
 Thus, an increase in total income may not affect expenditure activities 
identically irrespective of the source of the increase, as standard economic theory 
suggests.  Instead, an increase in income, depending on the ‘mental account’ it funds, 
may affect expenditure in one activity more than others.  In fact, if an increase in one 
source of income causes a decrease in another source because of a change in earning 
activities, that may cause a decrease in a particular expenditure activity, even if the net 
effect on total income is positive. 
 Kooreman (2000) found expenditure on children’s clothing was much more 
responsive to changes in child allowance funds from the Dutch government than it was 
to changes in other sources of income.  Thus, a particular source of income was 
earmarked for a certain type of spending activity.  Standard theory would predict that a 
change in child allowances would cause households to reallocate income such that 
expenditure activities would respond identically to how they would have responded to 
changes in any other source of income.  However, because of non-fungibility, changes 
in government child allowances had a very different impact on child expenditures than 
did changes in other sources of income.  In other words, child allowances from the 
government did not cause families to reallocate their income previously spent on child 
expenses towards other activities.  It instead increased child expenditures. 
25 
 Using an additively decomposable measure, which allows for poverty to be 
distributed among population subgroups, Greer and Thorbecke (1986) estimate the 
magnitude, distribution, and factors associated with food poverty for Kenyan 
smallholders.  They start with a multivariate analysis of variables associated with food 
consumption and then turn to a poverty profile which decomposes food poverty into 
six sets of variables:  region of residence, household size and composition, household 
landholding size, cropping pattern and market involvement, type of employment, and 
individual characteristics of the household head.  In the multivariate analysis, Greer 
and Thorbecke find that both the percent of income from own farm production and 
from farm operating surplus are positively and significantly related to calorie 
consumption.  On the other hand, off-farm income earned by the household head was 
found to be significantly negatively associated with calorie consumption.  The authors 
propose that an explanation for this result is that when the household head works off 
his own farm, all else being equal, he allocates more of his off-farm income to 
nonfood items than he would of on-farm income.  In the food poverty profiles, they 
found the important positive determinants of food consumption were land holdings, 
rural employment (as opposed to urban employment), crop and livestock sales, and 
farm equipment value. 
 While Greer and Thorbecke (1986) do not explicitly test for mental 
accounting, there do appear to be differential responses of food consumption to 
changes in various income sources.  Mental accounting could be a possible 
explanation for this.  This leads to an important question of whether total income itself 
is a strong determining factor of nutrient consumption in poor households or if truer 
relationships are found in decomposing income and wealth based on income sources 
that are prevalent in the region and communities being examined. 
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 Studies explicitly testing for mental accounting in a development context are 
scarce.  Hoffmann (2007) investigates whether there is a mental accounting effect 
influencing the allocation of insecticide-treated mosquito nets to those who are more 
vulnerable to malaria within households in Uganda.  Households were separated into a 
buying condition and a free nets condition.  In both scenarios, participants were read a 
statement regarding malaria and were told of the particular danger it poses to young 
children and to pregnant women.  Those in the buying condition were given enough 
cash to purchase enough mosquito nets to cover their entire household and then given 
the opportunity to purchase nets.  Those in the free nets condition were simply given 
enough nets to cover their household and then were given the opportunity to exchange 
their nets for cash.  Night home visits were then made to participant households to 
check the usage of each net.  Some striking differences emerged between households 
in a buying condition and those in a free nets condition.  An individual who earns all 
of the household’s income is no more likely to be using the mosquito nets than 
members earning no income in the free nets condition.  However, in the buying 
condition, the income earner is 50% more likely to be using the nets than those who 
earn no income.  Also if the nets were purchased, the household member randomly 
selected to do so was 16% more likely to be using the net, whereas if the net were 
received freely, that individual was no more likely to be using the net than anyone else 
in the household.  Even if the net was received by the same individual, how it was 
received changed who had access to it. 
 Duflo and Udry (2004) examined consumption choices among households in 
Cote d’Ivoire.  They investigated how the demand for different types of goods is 
affected by different income sources.  Some income is earned through appreciated 
products, which are defined as those that are controlled by the household head “for 
redistribution to the entire household in the form of food”.  Descriptions from 
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anthropologists of how different sources of income are spent seem to resemble the 
consumption behavior described by mental accounting theories.  They suggest non-
fungible income and wealth resources generated from different economic activities, 
even when those activities are performed by the same individual and regardless of 
whether those resources are cash or in kind.  In other words, different categories of 
expenditure are decided by different sources of income—“mental accounts”—and 
transfers between those accounts are not freely made.  Duflo and Udry investigate the 
empirical validity of these descriptions by testing if and how shocks to different 
income sources impact expenditure shares above and beyond their impact on overall 
expenditure. 
 Duflo and Udry (2004) find that changes in male and female income yield 
different effects on expenditure.  They further find that although men typically 
cultivate yams, they are considered an appreciated crop, and thus, the effects on 
expenditure from changes in yam income are drastically different from those of other 
male-cultivated crops.  More specifically, they find that the consumption of adult and 
prestige goods (tobacco, alcohol, jewelry, and adult clothing) is strongly associated 
with variations in income from male non-yam crops and female cultivated crops.  
Variations in yam income, on the other hand, are strongly associated with spending on 
household public goods and basic necessities, such as education, food staples, and 
overall food consumption.  For example, education expenditures are positively related 
to yam income, but are inversely related to income from male- and female-controlled 
non-yam crops.  Increases in yam income are associated with decreases in spending on 
adult and prestige goods, whereas increases in income from male non-yam crops 
results in a decrease in spending on food.  Consequently, income shifts from yam 
output to either male- or female-controlled non-yam crops would be associated with 
substantial declines in education and food staple expenditures and a substantial rise in 
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expenditure on adult and prestige goods.  The authors further explain that while the 
male household head formally controls yam income, as an appreciated good, there are 
strong social sanctions against misusing this income.  Thus would lend itself to the 
non-fungibility of spending from this account and is consistent with the authors’ 
findings. 
 The findings of Duflo and Udry (2004) and Hoffmann (2007) highlight the 
importance of understanding “mental accounting” behavior in poor communities.  
Nutrient intake elasticities with respect to particular sources of income may in fact be 
zero, or even negative, while elasticities with respect to other sources of income may 
be substantially higher.  Consequently, income-generating programs concerned with 
the food intake of poor households may be ineffective, or even counter-productive, if 
they are not targeting appropriate income sources.  Recognizing and understanding 
mental accounting behavior in poor communities in developing countries can have a 
substantial positive impact on development efforts and appropriately targeting 
policies.  However, as mental accounting behavior may not be homogenous across 
different communities, this also challenges researchers and policy-makers to better 
understand the economic and social structure of the communities with which they are 
concerned. 
 If mental accounting plays a prominent role in the consumption behavior of 
poor households in developing countries, then this has important implications for how 
the relationship between income and nutrition is assessed.  Household food 
expenditures may respond very differently to fluctuations in total income depending 
on which income source is changing.  If a household experiences an increase in 
income only from a source not typically used for food expenditures, then household 
food intake may be little affected by even dramatic changes in total income.  This 
would result in a low estimate of the household’s income elasticity of nutrient 
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demand.  The low elasticity could then indicate to policymakers and researchers that 
income does not matter to the nutritional status of individuals in poor households, 
when in fact, it is not that income does not matter, but that where income comes from 
does matter.  Acquiring a better understanding of mental accounting and the 
consumption behavior of poor households will better equip policymakers to more 
appropriately and effectively target income generating programs. 
 
IV.  Intrahousehold Resource Allocation and Individual Welfare 
While the average well-being of the household might be one of the largest 
determinants of the well-being of its members, nutritional well-being is a feature of 
the individual not the household.  The household, though, may be the most important 
institution influencing the welfare of the individual.  Consequently, development 
practitioners and policymakers cannot be indifferent to processes of intrahousehold 
resource allocation.  Understanding not only how households allocate income to 
expenditure activities, but also how households allocate resources to its individual 
members is essential in evaluating income generation and pricing policies.  Deaton 
(1997) points out that if members in a household are treated differently, but equality is 
assumed then true inequality is understated and social welfare is overstated.  Haddad 
and Kanbur (1990) show that the order of ranking of different socioeconomic and 
geographic groups by their nutritional status can change depending on whether 
individual or household level data are used. 
 There is a large literature in development economics evaluating whether and to 
what extent the intrahousehold allocation of resources differ according to demographic 
groups, such as gender and age.  This examination proposes many challenges because 
in order for one to make any definitive welfare statements concerning a particular 
group within the household, he must not only consider the relative level of household 
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resources allocated to that group, but also the relative volatility of those allocations 
along with that group’s marginal utility from resource allocations as well as their need 
according to activities and endowments.  Thus disparities in nutrient intake alone 
among different demographic groups do not necessarily signify disparities in 
nutritional welfare. 
 A number of studies have endeavored to examine the existence and magnitude 
of intrahousehold inequality by comparing income and price elasticities of household 
resource allocation for different demographic groups.  Awareness of elasticity 
differences would allow for better and more informed evaluations of the welfare 
impacts of income growth and pricing policies.  A number of studies have found 
consumption and human capital investment to be less price and income elastic for 
more “favored” demographic groups then for less favored ones (e.g., Behrman, 1988, 
Alderman and Gertler, 1997).  This result implies that favored groups are more able to 
smooth their consumption over fluctuations in income and food prices.  Higher income 
and price elasticities also imply that the nutrient intake of less favored groups is more 
volatile than that of more favored groups. 
 In a study of households in rural South India, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) 
find that the nutrient intake of females is more price elastic than that of males.  The 
authors conclude that these higher elasticities could leave women and girls vulnerable 
during lean seasons and times of food shortages.  This implies that females suffer a 
greater risk of hunger and malnutrition.  In a study of the same households, Behrman 
(1988), finds that households exhibit a pro-male bias in the allocation of nutrients to 
children during the lean season. 
 Alderman and Gertler (1997) demonstrate theoretically that demand for human 
capital of less favored demographic groups will be more income and price elastic than 
that of a more favored group.  This occurs under the same conditions that lead to 
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higher levels of investment in the favored group.15  They further show that the price 
elasticity of human capital demand falls as income rises and does so at a faster rate for 
the less favored group than the more favored group.  This implies that the disparity in 
gender price elasticities will diminish as income level rises.  Alderman and Gertler 
(1997) then show empirically that demand for healthcare services is more price and 
income elastic for girls than it is for boys in a study of households in Pakistan.  They 
further find that this difference disappears at higher levels of income. 
 Mangyo (2008) claims that higher income and price elasticities of human 
capital investment do not necessarily indicate weaker household status.  He contends 
that previous studies on this matter are highly stylized and largely influenced by the 
notion that human capital investments in boys are more necessary than they are in 
girls.  Models in these studies often assume that there is no difference in the rate at 
which marginal utility of human capital investment changes with changes in the level 
of human capital investment.  He also claims that previous studies have not adequately 
controlled for potential confounding factors correlated with human capital investment.  
Mangyo (2008) then demonstrates theoretically that it is inconclusive whether human 
capital investment in a favored household member is more or less elastic than it is for 
other household members.  He explains that as household income increases, the rate at 
which resource allocation to individuals increases depends on the rate at which the 
marginal utility and productivity of one household member fall relative to others. 
 Using a large data set from China, Mangyo (2008) estimates nutrient intake 
elasticities for six demographic groups:  prime age men, prime age women, elderly 
men, elderly women, boys and girls.  After controlling for potential confounding 
factors correlated with human capital investment, he finds that prime age men have the 
                                                 
15 Higher levels of investment in a favored group might be due to higher levels of productivity in that 
group, higher rates of return from resources invested in that group, or household preferences or 
favoritism. 
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highest nutrient intake elasticity with respect to income, females have lower 
elasticities than males, and that elderly household members generally have lower 
elasticities than other groups. 
 Other than comparing income and price elasticities among various 
demographic groups, studies have attempted to understand potential individual welfare 
disparities within the household by investigating how risk is shared among household 
members.  Dercon and Krishnan (2000) investigate whether rural Ethiopian 
households engage in complete risk sharing.  They test whether intrahousehold 
resource allocations are unaffected by individual-specific shocks.  In most households 
they found that there is full risk sharing of unpredicted illness.  However in poor 
households in southern Ethiopia they found that risk was not fully shared.  In these 
households, the women were not fully insured against unpredicted illness whereas 
men were. 
 Pitt et al. (1990) develop a model of intrahousehold allocation that 
incorporates the interactions among nutrition, labor market productivity, health 
endowments, as well as the intrahousehold distribution of food and work activities.  
They examine whether households reinforce the higher endowment of more 
productive individuals by allocating them more food (meaning that the household is 
income maximizing) or if instead, lower-endowed individuals are compensated with 
higher food and lower labor allocations (meaning the household is inequality averse).  
In a study of households in Bangladesh, they find that men have both a higher level 
and higher variance in calories consumed than women.  They also observe that men 
exhibit higher rates of participation in energy-intensive activities in which productivity 
is influenced by health status.  The authors find that although there appears to be a 
larger rate of calorie reinforcement for adult males than adult females, these 
individuals are also much more likely to be involved in energy-intensive activities.  
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This results in a “tax” on adult male endowments that exceeds that of adult females.  
Thus households in this study ultimately appeared to be more inequality averse than 
income maximizing. 
 Food allocation within the household has been a widely studied facet of 
intrahousehold distribution.16  While a number of studies have found a pro-male bias 
in intrahousehold nutrient distribution, this result has been predominantly found in 
Northern India and Bangladesh.  Outside of these regions, evidence for male bias is 
scarce (Haddad, et al., 1996).  The mixed evidence pertaining to intrahousehold 
inequality discussed above points to the inherent danger in assuming a priori the 
existence of intrahousehold equality or inequality.  Misunderstanding this essential 
component of resource allocation can have potentially serious implications for the 
welfare impacts of development programs and policies.  Therefore intrahousehold 
dynamics must be considered for effective and appropriate policy design. 
 
V.  Nutrition, Income and Wealth in African Pastoralist Communities 
 The 2006 UNDP Human Development Report put Kenya among the “low 
human development” countries of the world, ranking it 152nd out of 177 countries.  
Endemic poverty, low economic growth, drought prone arid and semi-arid lands, and 
high population growth contributed to increased hunger in the country.  Poverty and 
vulnerability can be particularly acute among pastoralists in remote areas.  Many 
households in these areas are chronically poor and there are persistently high 
malnutrition rates among children under five (World Food Program, 2008). 
 Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world ranking 170th of the 177 
countries on the Human Development Index.  Poverty and food insecurity are 
widespread.  Of the country’s population of 77.5 million, 31 million people live below 
                                                 
16 For a good review of this literature see Haddad et al. (1996). 
34 
the poverty line and 6 to 13 million are at risk of starvation.  Transitory and chronic 
food insecurity are major challenges facing the rural population (World Food 
Program, 2006).  Of Ethiopia’s population, 44 percent are undernourished and 38 
percent of its children are underweight for their age.  Recurrent drought, disruptions 
from strife, soil exhaustion and erosion, as well as overcrowding of human and animal 
populations contribute to food insecurity, particularly in pastoralist areas (World Food 
Program, 2008).  Under these circumstances, effectively targeting development and 
aid policies is vital.  Developing well designed and appropriately targeted policies 
based on sound empirical evidence is essential to enhancing pastoral livelihoods and 
nutritional well-being.  Unfortunately there is a paucity of empirical studies on 
nutritional determinants for African pastoralist households. 
 The primary economic activities of pastoralist communities all heavily rely on 
livestock.  For this reason, many of the studies relating wealth and income to nutrition 
in pastoralist households have examined degree of livestock wealth as a potential 
nutritional determinant.  Many of these studies have observed little to no association.  
McCabe et al. (1997) found that children had low weight-for-height measures in both 
wealthier and less prosperous households in Tanzania.  In a study of Maasai 
households in Kenya, Grandin (1988) found little association between levels of milk 
consumption and livestock wealth. In a study of Datoga households in Tanzania, 
Sellen (2003) found that the number of cows milked per adult women did not increase 
with domestic herd size.  He also found that households with middle-sized domestic 
herds (relative to the herd size of other households in the study) had a higher 
percentage of household caloric requirements satisfied by maize, meat and milk.  The 
lack of association between livestock wealth and levels of milk consumption or 
number of cows milked found by Grandin (1988) and Sellen (2003), respectively, may 
be due to the abundance of overall milk supply in these communities.  Most 
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households in these communities tend to own livestock.  This means that most 
households are able to some extent home produce milk and that there is not likely a 
large local milk market in these communities. Therefore once a certain threshold of 
milk production is satisfied, it is not inconceivable that increases in livestock wealth 
would not strongly coincide with increases in milk production or consumption.  Many 
postulate that the lack of association between herd wealth and nutritional status is due 
to ‘egalitarian’ systems of wealth redistribution present in pastoralist societies (Sellen, 
2003).  Sellen (2003) also points out there may be an emphasis on using livestock to 
enhance livestock productivity and herd size rather than increase human consumption.  
Certainly there is evidence on the importance of herd accumulation to household 
survival and welfare in pastoral areas (Lybbert, et al., 2004, McPeak, 2005). 
 A number of studies have found that herd accumulation is the best means 
available to pastoralists to self-insure against risk (Lybbert, et al., 2004, McPeak, 
2005).  Lybbert et al. (2004) note that shocks such as prolonged droughts can cause 
pastoralist households to lose 50% or more of their herds.  Moreover, if households do 
not escape the shock with a herd size above a certain threshold, they might be forced 
into a sedentarized production system, which usually means chronic, dire poverty. 
 It has also been found that holding assets in the form of livestock has a 
substantially higher rate of return than alternative savings methods available to 
pastoralists (Barrett, et al., 2006, McPeak, 2005).  Thus pastoralist households appear 
to prefer using their herds as a “walking bank,” drawing on livestock to meet 
immediate consumption needs only when cash is otherwise not available (Bellemare 
and Barrett, 2006).  Consequently, livestock wealth and income may not be the most 
relevant form of wealth or income to examine when exploring the consumption 
behaviors of pastoralist households. 
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 If drawing down on livestock assets is thought of as a last resort for most 
pastoralist households then it might no be appropriate to examine herd size changes 
when attempting to understand how pastoralists meet their consumption needs and 
what determines their nutritional status.  Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there has 
yet to be a study of this kind using other income sources. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Food is the most essential consumption good for survival.  In fact, of the eight UN 
Millennium Development Goals, the first one listed is to “eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger” (UN, 2008).  In order to design well-targeted and appropriate policies 
combating malnutrition and hunger, it is first essential to understand what determines 
and influences household food expenditures and, once acquired, how food resources 
are distributed to individual members within the household. 
 The following chapters of this thesis seek to address those two questions in a 
pastoral context.  Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between nutrition and 
household income.  In order to address some of the qualitative and quantitative 
complaints about traditional methods of measuring nutrient intake, dietary diversity is 
used as the dependent variable.  The chapter investigates whether food consumption 
behavior has differential responses to changes in various income sources and considers 
mental accounting, as well as other candidate explanations, as potential factors 
shaping food consumption decisions in pastoralist households. 
 Chapter 3 explores the intrahousehold dynamics of food consumption.  In this 
chapter individual-level income and price elasticities of dietary diversity are measured 
to indicate nutritional volatility.   These elasticities are then compared among different 
demographic groups within the household in order to draw out welfare implications.  
Demographic group elasticities are then tested to see if they differ depending on 
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whether current household income is above or below its intertemporal mean.  Then the 
welfare of different demographic groups are compared to see if certain groups are 
systematically better off than others given the level and volatility of their food 
consumption. 
 Development programs targeting pastoralist communities in East Africa have 
often proved disappointing.  Better understanding how individual nutrition responds to 
various income growth programs and pricing policies as well as how those responses 
vary (or do not vary) within the pastoralist household may better equip policy makers 
to design well-targeted programs.  The papers of this thesis aim to contribute to that 
understanding. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DIFFERENTIAL NUTRITIONAL RESPONSES ACROSS VARIOUS INCOME 
SOURCES AMONG EAST AFRICAN PASTORALISTS:  INTRAHOUSEHOLD 
EFFECTS, MISSING MARKETS AND MENTAL ACCOUNTING 
 
The field of development economics is largely devoted to exploring ways of 
combating poverty, along with its many adverse effects.  In countries at all levels of 
development, the food insecurity and low nutrient intake of the poor have occupied a 
central place in the study of poverty.  Until recent decades, it was generally thought 
that the most effective way to combat hunger and malnutrition was through economic 
growth and, more specifically, raising the incomes of the poor.  Conventional wisdom 
has held that while nutrient intake may not rise one for one with income, the income 
elasticity of nutrient demand is still substantially greater than zero.  
In the last few decades however, some studies have challenged this idea 
arguing that increases in income will not produce substantial improvements in 
nutritional well-being (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, Behrman and Deolalikar 1989, 
Behrman and Deolalikar 1987, Behrman et al. 1988, Bouis 1994, Bouis and Haddad 
1992).  If this claim holds true, then it has significant implications for how economists 
and policymakers think about the effects of economic growth and development on 
hunger, malnutrition and household food security. 
Traditionally it has been thought that the low nutrient intake of the poor is 
largely due to low income.  Substantial resources have therefore been devoted to 
income growth programs aimed at improving nutrition in poor communities.  
However, despite many studies on the subject, there is still little agreement over the 
extent to which the nutritional status of the poor responds to changes in their income.  
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Studies examining this matter often look at the intake changes of specific nutrients, 
particularly calories, in relation to changes in some measure of income.  The scope of 
the debate on this relationship ranges from studies arguing that the calorie-income 
curve is essentially flat (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, Behrman and Deolalikar 1987, 
Bouis 1994, Bouis and Haddad 1992, Wolfe and Behrman 1983) to the other extreme 
where studies have estimated income elasticities of caloric demand close to one (Pitt 
1983, Strauss 1984).  Other studies find a concave or elbow-shaped calorie-income 
curve (Ravallion 1990, Strauss and Thomas 1995, Strauss and Thomas 1990, 
Subramanian and Deaton 1996).  These latter findings indicate that among the very 
poor, nutritional intakes would increase with income up to a certain level, after which 
the nutrient-income elasticity would decline, possibly to zero. 
A number of reasons have been proposed for the wide range of estimates of the 
nutrient-income elasticity for poor households.17  However, the vast majority of 
studies on this matter have not considered the possibility that nutrition may respond 
differently to different sources of income.  To my knowledge, studies have thus far 
only explored the nutrition-income relationship using total income.  Yet, there are 
reasons to believe that where income comes from may change how it is used in the 
household.  These reasons include intrahousehold dynamics, market imperfections or 
missing markets for certain goods, and mental accounting.  Thus nutritional status may 
have differential responses to changes in different income sources.  Therefore the 
                                                 
17 Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) argue that an aggregation bias resulting from common methods of 
inferring nutrient intake cause and upward bias in nutrient-income elasticity estimates.  Bouis and 
Haddad (1992) claim that estimates are often overestimated due to ‘wastages and leakages’ often 
unobserved by common data collection methods as well as because of correlated measurement errors 
between explanatory and dependent variables.  A number of other studies also point to non-linearities in 
the relationship between nutrient intake and income that are often unaccounted for in functional forms 
modeling this relationship (Ravallion 1990, Strauss and Thomas 1995, Strauss and Thomas 1990, 
Subramanian and Deaton 1996). 
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impact of income on nutrition might be more appropriately evaluated with income 
disaggregated into different sources. 
The rest of this paper explores the possibility of differential nutritional 
responses to changes in various income sources.  Section II briefly reviews evidence 
thus far for the existence of differential responses and reasons why they might occur, 
such as intrahousehold dynamics, market imperfections and mental accounting.  
Section III develops an empirical model of nutrition allowing for differential responses 
of nutrition across various income sources.  Section IV describes the data set used for 
this paper and the setting from which it comes.  Section V describes the econometric 
specifications used for estimation.  Section VI discusses the estimation results and 
tests for differential responses of dietary diversity to different income sources.  
Possible explanations for differential responses are tested for in Section VII.  Finally 
Section VIII concludes. 
 
I. Differential Nutritional Responses across Income Sources 
 There is evidence that changes in certain sources of income may impact food 
intake differently than changes in other sources   A number of studies have found 
intrahousehold dynamics of resource control and allocation cause different sources of 
income to impact expenditure patterns and activities differently (Breunig and 
Dasgupta 2005, Haddad et al. 1996).  Other studies have found differential 
expenditure responses to changes in various income sources that were seemingly due 
to mental accounting (Duflo and Udry 2004, Hoffmann 2007, Kooreman 2000, 
O’Curry 1997).18  Differential nutritional responses to income sources may also result 
due to the failure or absence of markets for certain home-produced goods (de Janvry et 
al. 1991). 
                                                 
18 For a good discussion of mental accounting of some of the literature on it see Thaler (1999). 
47 
 Intrahousehold Distributional Effects 
 Intrahousehold dynamics might cause household consumption to respond 
differently to changes in different sources of income due to differences in preferences 
and resource control across various household members.  Income sources typically 
controlled by household members more concerned with diet and nutrition may have a 
very different impact on household food intake than other income sources controlled 
by members less interested in nutrition.  A number of studies have found that 
household resources and extra income controlled by women are typically more likely 
to be allocated towards the production of nutrition than those of men.19 
 Empirical studies have found that households in the United States exhibit a 
higher marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamps than out of cash 
income, even when households are unconstrained,20 implying that food stamp income 
has a different impact on household consumption than cash income (Breunig and 
Dasgupta, 2005).  Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) conjecture that this discrepancy is 
driven primarily by intrahousehold distribution effects.  If so, then one would expect 
multiple-adult households to exhibit this behavior but not single-adult households.  
Studying households in San Diego, Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) find that single-adult 
households show no difference in their marginal propensity to consume food out food 
stamp or cash income, while multiple-adult households have an approximately six to 
eight times higher marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp income 
than cash income.  The authors interpret this economically and statistically significant 
difference as supporting their intrahousehold hypothesis. 
                                                 
19 For a review of this literature see Haddad et al. (1996). 
20 A household is unconstrained if it receives food stamps and but also spends a positive amount of cash 
income on food. 
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 Market Failures and Missing Markets 
 Household specific market failures, or missing markets in an extreme case, for 
particular commodities may also cause varying expenditure responses to different 
income sources.  Selective market failures for certain home-produced goods may 
result when household transaction costs associated with market participation for those 
goods increase to the point where those goods are rendered non-tradable for the 
household in question.  This then induces such households to be autarkic producers 
and consumers of those particular goods.  Thus increases in household production of 
those goods would increase consumption of just those goods, but have little to no 
impact on other household consumption goods.  For example, if market failures cause 
a household to be an autarkic producer and consumer of maize, then marginal 
increases in maize production would increase household maize consumption but have 
no substantial impact on household education expenditures.  Thus, household-specific 
missing markets or market failures may cause expenditure activities to respond 
differently to changes in different sources of income (de Janvry et al. 1991). 
 
Mental Accounting 
 Finally, households may spend various income sources differently due to what 
behavioral economists refer to as mental accounting.  One component of mental 
accounting is that income is not fungible across different sources as standard 
economic theory assumes.  Instead, people may assign certain expenditure activities, 
implicitly or explicitly, to specific ‘mental’ accounts funded by different sources of 
income.  Thus changes in income and wealth in one mental account, such as a 
windfall, are not perfect substitutes for income changes in another account, such as 
wages for labor. 
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 Instances of mental accounting are fairly well documented in consumer 
behavior in developed countries and in experimental economics.21  However, studies 
explicitly testing for mental accounting in developing countries are scarce.  In a study 
conducted in Uganda, Hoffmann (2007) found that households who received 
insecticide-treated mosquito nets were more likely to use them for household members 
most vulnerable to the effects of malaria.  Alternatively, if households received cash to 
purchase the nets on site, the nets were much more likely to be used by main income-
earners in the household.  Duflo and Udry (2004) found evidence of mental 
accounting in the expenditure patterns of households in Cote d’Ivoire.  They found 
that yam cultivation, which is typically male-controlled, had a strong positive 
association with spending on household public goods and basic necessities, such as 
education, food staples, and overall food consumption.  They also found that changes 
in income from male non-yam crops and female cultivated crops were strongly 
associated with the consumption of adult and prestige goods (tobacco, alcohol, 
jewelry, adult clothing and non-staple foods).  Furthermore, increases in yam income 
were associated with decreases in spending on adult and prestige goods, whereas 
increases in income from male non-yam crops resulted in decreases in spending on 
food. 
 Factors associated with intrahousehold dynamics, missing markets and mental 
accounting could all cause differential nutritional responses across various income 
sources.  With this in mind, it would be prudent to test the appropriateness of nutrition 
demand models using aggregated income as an explanatory variable rather than 
disaggregated income.  Instead of looking at nutritional responses to changes in total 
income, it might by more appropriate to explore which income sources appear to be 
                                                 
21 For a review of the literature on mental accounting see Thaler (1999). 
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important to food expenditures and what are the nutritional responses to changes in 
different income components. 
 
II.  Model 
 The focus of this paper is to discover whether households exhibit differential 
nutritional responses to various sources of income.  Previous studies in the 
development literature examining the nutrition-income relationship have assumed 
equivalent income elasticities of nutrition across various income sources.  A common 
functional form in this literature follows the log-linear equation: 
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where 
i is an index for the individual, 
v indexes the village or location, 
t indexes the time period, 
N is some measure of level of nutrition, 
Y is income, 
P is the price of food commodity j, 
H is household specific characteristic k, 
V is village or location specific characteristic c, 
 is unobserved individual specific effects and 
 is the disturbance term. 
This model has been modified to allow for variations in nutrition-income elasticities 
across levels of income (Strauss and Thomas 1990, Subramanian and Deaton 1996).  
However studies modifying this model to allow for nutrition-income elasticities to 
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vary across income sources are scarce.22  If households do in fact have different 
nutrition elasticities with respect to different income sources, then estimated nutrition 
elasticities with respect to total income may be misleading. 
 To illustrate, say a household earns income from two different sources, Y1 and 
Y2.  Suppose the household uses income Y2 primarily for food purchases and income 
Y1 mostly for other expenditure activities and rarely for food expenditures.  Suppose 
further that the nutrition elasticity with respect to Y2 is positive while that with respect 
to Y1 is zero.  Say this household experiences a large increase in Y1 and a very small 
increase in Y2.  Consequently the household experiences a large increase in total 
income but a very small increase in food expenditures, resulting in an estimated 
nutrition elasticity with respect to total income that is close to zero.  This result masks 
the positive nutrition elasticity with respect to Y1.  On the other hand, if the large 
increase in total income was primarily due to an increase in Y2, then a larger positive 
total income elasticity of nutrition would be estimated masking the zero nutrition 
elasticity with respect to Y1.  Either case could lead to mistargeted income growth 
programs concerned with nutrition. 
 The nutrition literature has estimated nutrition-income elasticities ranging from 
near zero (Behrman and Deolalikar 1990, Behrman and Deolalikar 1987, Bouis 1994, 
Bouis and Haddad 1992, Wolfe and Behrman 1983) to almost one (Pitt 1983, Strauss 
1984).  One possible explanation for this wide range of estimates is not accounting for 
the possibility of differential nutritional responses to changes in various income 
sources.  The assumption that income elasticities of nutrition are equivalent across 
income sources has not been tested to date. 
                                                 
22 The only study I am aware of that allows nutritional responses to vary across income sources is Duflo 
and Udry (2004). 
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 To explicitly test the assumption of equivalent nutrition elasticities we 
disaggregate income by source in (1) to get the following: 
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where k indexes income sources and 
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Using (2)  we can test the null hypothesis 
(4) H0:
 where nm   nm  , km 1  and kn 1  
A rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate that there exist differential nutritional 
responses to different income sources and thus (1) is not an appropriate model for 
estimating nutrition elasticities with respect to income. 
 However this model is only adequate if the composition of income is similar 
among households at different levels of wealth.  There is substantial evidence that 
nutrition income elasticities vary at different levels of wealth.  Therefore if there are 
systematic differences in the income composition between poor and rich households, 
which are not controlled for explicitly, and these are related to patterns of income 
earning, then a rejection of the above null hypothesis may just be picking up 
differences in income-nutrition elasticities at various levels of wealth as opposed to 
differences due to income source.  Therefore (2) must be further modified to allow for 
non-linearities in the relationship between the nutrition-income elasticity and income 
level. 
 To allow income elasticities to differ over different levels of income, dummy 
variables indicating the income quantile to which the household belongs are included 
in the model as both intercept shifters as well as interacted with income and price 
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variables to allow for income and price elasticities to change with the level of 
income.23  This gives us the following equation 
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where Q is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual i belongs to income 
quantile l and l = 1, 2, 3,…L.  This gives L testable hypothesis. 
(6) H10:1k 
 where nm 11   nm  , km 1  and kn 1  
H20:2k 
 where nm 22   nm  , km 1  and kn 1  
. 
. 
. 
HL0:LLLLk 
L where LnLm   nm  , km 1  and kn 1  
 Equation (5) allows for different income and price elasticities of nutrition at 
different levels of income and also controls for the possibility for differential 
nutritional responses due to wealth differentials as opposed to income source 
differentials.  A rejection of the null hypotheses in hypothesis (6) indicates that 
nutritional status does not respond equivalently to changes in different sources of 
income for individuals in that income quantile.  This would indicate that a model using 
                                                 
23 As another way of capturing these effects, Strauss and Thomas (1990) proposed a few functional 
forms of log-inverse log models that seemed to work well.  However these models are problematic if 
there are a number of observations where the log of income is between 0 and 1.  Since in this paper, 
income is disaggregated there are many zero observations for each income source variable.  This proved 
to be problematic when working with the log-inverse functional forms proposed by Strauss and Thomas 
(1990). 
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aggregated income as an explanatory variable is less appropriate than one in which 
income is disaggregated. 
 
III.  Data and Setting 
 The data for this paper come from a comprehensive set of panel data collected 
by the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program (GL CRSP) 
project “Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African Rangelands” 
(PARIMA).  Households were surveyed in five locations in southern Ethiopia and six 
in northern Kenya24, all in one livestock production and marketing region (Barrett et 
al. 2008).  In total, 337 households are included in the data.25  In each household the 
household head was surveyed along with up to two adult, non-head household 
members.  Only household heads are included in this particular study.  Surveys were 
conducted in March 2000 for baseline information and then quarterly from June 2000 
to June 2002, resulting in 10 quarterly observations for each household.26  Survey 
intervals were chosen to correspond to the bimodal rainfall patterns of the study 
region.  Further details on these data are provided in Barrett et al. (2008). 
 The baseline survey gives information on individual and household 
characteristics such as household size, sex, age and education.  The repeated surveys 
provide information on income earned from various sources such as trade, wages and 
salary, crop value, and remittances.  They also report households’ livestock holdings, 
trade, and production. 
                                                 
24 The six study locations in Kenya were Dirib Gumbo, Kargi, Logologo, Ng’ambo, North Horr, and 
Sugata Marmar.  In Ethiopia the study sites were Dida Hara, Dillo, Finchawa, Qorate, and Wachille. 
25 Due to some issues of attrition, interruption and missing observations of particular variables for 
certain individuals or communities the number of observations per survey period ranges from 186 to 
303.  Also, due to some known measurement error, the top and bottom 5% of observations over the 
observed income distribution were deleted from the study. 
26 The baseline survey in March 2000 did not provide dietary information or information on income 
over the quarter.  Therefore this study included only 9 quarterly observations from June 2000 to June 
2002 and information from the March 2000 survey was only used for baseline information on the 
household. 
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 While a number of households are involved in activities such as trade, wage 
labor, or, to a very limited extend, crop cultivation, primary economic activities for 
most households in the area are centered on livestock.  Pastoralism allows households 
to be opportunistic in the arid and semi-arid lands of the study region where uncertain 
rainfall makes primary production risky (Coppock, 1994).  Only six households in the 
data do not own livestock over the study period.  Mean annual rainfall in the study 
area is just around 400mm, making crop cultivation difficult.  Therefore, pastoralist 
households rely chiefly on livestock for income.  Average household herd size in the 
data is 12.10 tropical livestock units (TLU).27  Production of livestock products makes 
up roughly 48% of all income earned in the study area over the survey period.  
Livestock trade is 17%, wages and salary is 11%, net remittances if 16%, non-farm 
non-livestock trade and business make up 5%, and crop value comprises only 2% of 
all income earned in the study area.  Table 1 summarizes aggregated and 
disaggregated income in the study population. 
 In order to estimate equation (3) and control for the possibility of wealth 
differentials causing income elasticities to differ between income sources, the sample 
is broken up into three income terciles based on households’ mean intertemporal 
income.  Table 2 describes the income and its composition for the lower, middle, and 
upper terciles.  The percentage shares of total income for trade and business, livestock 
trade, and crop value do not change substantially across income terciles.  The income 
share of wages and salary increase somewhat from 5% and 4% in the lower and 
middle terciles, respectively, to 11% in the upper tercile.  The value of livestock 
products produced increases from 35% in the lower tercile to 49% in the middle and 
upper terciles.   The most drastic difference across income terciles is the in the share of 
                                                 
27 TLU is a standard measure for aggregating herd size across various species.  1 cattle = 1 TLU, 1 
camel = 0.7 TLU, and 1 sheep or goat = 0.1 TLU. 
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Table 2.1: Full Sample Summary Statistics 
N=2089 
Groups=318 
 Proportion of 
Total Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Total Income 1.00 7417.92 7433.77 380 34233.79 
Trade and Business 0.06 409.94 1470.14 0 27000 
Wages and Salary 0.06 826.19 3608.95 0 30000 
Livestock Trade 0.13 1250.43 2745.27 0 30000 
Livestock Products 0.44 3556.13 5237.63 0 32850 
Crop Value 0.02 160.52 1194.36 0 25080 
Remittances 0.29 1214.70 1779.28 0 28463.9 
Herd Size (TLU)  12.16 18.01 0 269.93 
Dietary Diversity  3.17 1.50 1 8 
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Table 2.2:  Full Sample Summary Statistics by Income Tercile 
 N %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lower Tercile 698      
Total Income  1.00 3160.63 2637.04 400 19601.38
Trade and 
Business 
 0.06
(0.17)
189.45 635.82 0 5700
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.05
(0.16)
143.95 740.26 0 15000
Livestock Trade  0.11
(0.25)
572.34 1489.84 0 10407.52
Livestock 
Products 
 0.34
(0.38)
1105.66 1758.93 0 19601.38
Crop Value  0.02
(0.13)
86.43 454.04 0 6004
Remittances  0.41
(0.38)
1062.81 1364.58 0 13182.44
Middle Tercile 700   
Total Income  1.00 6195.45 5680.39 380 33705.5
Trade and 
Business 
 0.05
(0.14)
260.02 970.71 0 12690
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.03
(0.13)
215.31 1134.87 0 18000
Livestock Trade  0.15
(0.27)
1437.09 3140.20 0 30000
Livestock 
Products 
   0.48
(0.37)
3056.51   3961.43 0 25374.25
Crop Value  0.02
(0.11)
156.71 1045.73 0 18120
Remittances  0.27
(0.32)
1069.80 1853.37 0 28463.9
Upper Tercile 691   
Total Income  1.00 12956.72 8771.47  515   34233.79
Trade and 
Business 
 0.07
(0.17)
784.55 2228.20 0 27000
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.11
(0.25)
2134.16 5915.43 0 30000
Livestock Trade  0.14
(0.23)
  1746.29 3134.93 0 17135.27
Livestock 
Products 
 0.49
(0.34)
  6537.57 6982.94 0   32850
Crop Value  0.02
(0.09)
  239.22 1728.83 0    25080
Remittances  0.17
(0.23)
1514.93 2021.01 0 15976.88
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Table 2.3: Full Sample Summary Statistics on Positive Income Earners 
 N  %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max 
Lower Tercile       
Total Income 698 1.00 3160.63 2637.04 400 19601.38
Trade and 
Business 
137 0.29
(0.27)
965.24 1147.85 18.20 5700
Wages and 
Salary 
91 0.37
(0.27)
1104.15 1780.98 30 15000
Livestock Trade 152 0.53
(0.28)
2628.23  2192.35 247 10407.52
Livestock 
Products 
387   0.62
(0.29)
1994.18 1951.94 136.88 19601.38
Crop Value 37 0.47
(0.33)
  1630.43  1184.93  29.42 6004
Remittances   
550 
0.52
(0.35)
1348.80 1406.28 10 13182.44
Middle Tercile   
Total Income 700 1.00 6195.45 5680.39 380 33705.5
Trade and 
Business 
167 0.19
(0.23)
1089.89 1748.68 10 12690
Wages and 
Salary 
88 0.27
(0.25)
1712.71 2784.56 50   18000
Livestock Trade 214 0.49
(0.26)
4700.76 4116.62 300 30000
Livestock 
Products 
539 0.62
(0.30)
3969.49 4093.7 127.75 25374.25
Crop Value 47 0.35
(0.28)
2334.02 3380.07 29.42 18120
Remittances 499 0.38
(0.32)
1500.72 2042.88 1.49 28463.9
Upper Tercile   
Total Income 691 1.00 12956.72 8771.47  515   34233.79
Trade and 
Business 
284 0.17
(0.23)
1908.88 3154.57 20 27000
Wages and 
Salary 
156 0.48
(0.48)
9453.25 9280.99   36  30000
Livestock Trade 291 0.33
(0.33)
4146.68 3659.96 300 17135.27
Livestock 
Products 
586 0.58
(0.58)
7708.98 6961.88 12.78 32850
Crop Value 36 0.31
(0.31)
4591.76 6194.06 160 25080
Remittances 554 0.22
(0.22)
1889.56 2094.56   11.86 15976.88
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 remittances in total household income.  Net remittances make up, on average, 41% of 
total household income in the lower tercile but only 26% and 17% in the middle and 
upper terciles, respectively.  Table 3 provides summary statistics only for period-
specific observations in which the household reported strictly positive income earnings 
for the particular income being described. 
 The repeated surveys also ask individuals to recall their own food and 
beverage consumption over the past 24-hours.  This information was used to 
calculated dietary diversity measures for each individual in each period.  Dietary 
diversity is defined here as the number of unique food and drink items consumed over 
the recall period.  For example, if an individual consumed three helpings of maize, one 
helping of beans, and two helpings of tea with milk, his dietary diversity count would 
be 4.  Mean dietary diversity in the sample population is 3.14 and median dietary 
diversity is 3.  Maize, tea and especially milk are by far the most consumed items in 
the study area. 
 
IV.  Econometric Specification 
 In order to test for differential nutritional responses to changes in different 
income sources, equation (5) is estimated using dietary diversity as a measure of 
nutritional status.  Studies on the income-nutrition relationship have often used 
nutrient intake or nutrient availability28 as a measure of nutritional status.  However 
both of these measures are subject to a number of quantitative and qualitative 
problems.29  In reaction to these problems, dietary diversity has been proposed as a 
                                                 
28 Nutrient availability is measured using food expenditures, indicating the amount of nutrients available 
to be consumed based on food purchases. 
29 See Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002) for a discussion of these 
problems. 
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potential alternative indicator of dietary quality and food security (Arimond and Ruel 
2004, Hatloy et al. 1998, Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002, Ogle et al. 2001, Onyango et 
al. 1998, Ruel 2002, Ruel 2003, Torheim et al. 2004).  While the PARIMA data do not 
have good nutrient intake or availability information, they do have good data on 
dietary diversity. 
 Dietary diversity is here defined as the number of unique food and drink items 
consumed over a 24-hour recall period.30  Lack of dietary diversity is especially 
problematic in poor communities in developing countries.  Through improved 
micronutrient acquirement, a diverse diet has long been associated with enhanced 
nutritional status.  Indeed, a number of studies have come out recently showing dietary 
diversity to be highly correlated with dietary quality and nutrient adequacy (Arimond 
and Ruel 2004, Hatloy et al. 1998, Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002, Ogle et al. 2001, 
Onyango et al. 1998, Torheim et al. 2004).  Studies have also found a consistent and 
positive association between child growth and dietary diversity (Arimond and Ruel 
2004, Onyango et al. 1998).  Dietary diversity is unlikely to suffer from the same 
measurement errors and bias problems that have been problematic in many of the 
more conventional measures of nutritional status (Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002, 
Strauss and Thomas 1995).  Consequently dietary diversity shows much promise as an 
indicator of dietary quality and is used here as the dependent variable in equation (5). 
 On the right-hand side of the equation (5), income is disaggregated into six 
different sources:  income earned from non-farm and non-livestock trade and business 
such as from crafts, firewood and water; income earned from wages and salary; 
income earned from livestock trade; income earned from the production of livestock 
products; the value of crops harvested; and net remittances, which includes the value 
                                                 
30 Dietary diversity can also be defined as the number of unique food groups an individual consumes 
over the recall period.  Recall periods can vary. 
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of cash and in-kind gifts as well as of food aid.31  Village level food prices included in 
the model are those for maize and tea.  Maize and tea are by far the most important 
food staples in the study region (other than milk which is mostly home produced since 
only a few households do not own livestock).  Age, education, gender and household 
size are included as controls for individual- and household-level characteristics.  To 
control for time-invariant village or location specific characteristics, regional dummy 
variables are included for 10 of the 11 locations. 
 
V.  Estimation Results 
 In this section equation (5) is estimated using a random effects generalized 
least squares estimator.  Since the discrete nature of dietary diversity would cause 
heteroskedasticity, White’s correction for heteroskedasticity was used.   Hypothesis 
(6) is then tested using a Wald test.  A rejection of the null hypotheses in (6) indicates 
that different income sources have differential effects on individual nutritional status.  
Once differential effects are established, possible explanations for this result are then 
tested. 
 
Full Sample Tests for Differential Effects 
 Full regression results are reported in the Appendix as A1 and A2.  Table 4 
reports the income and price elasticities estimated from equation (5) with income 
disaggregated.  It also includes estimated elasticities from equation (1) with 
aggregated income as the explanatory variable.  What is immediately striking is that 
the estimated income elasticities on both aggregated and disaggregated income are 
small relative to the estimated price elasticities.  The estimated total income elasticities  
                                                 
31 For details on how each income source was constructed see Barrett et al. (2008) 
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Table 2.4: Full Sample Elasticity Estimates 
N=2089 
Groups=318 
***, ** and * significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively 
 
Lower Middle Upper  
Elasticity
Standard
Error Elasticity
Standard
Error Elasticity 
Standard
Error 
Disaggregated Income Model 
Trade & 
Business 
0.020*** 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.011*** 0.004
Wages & Salary 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.007** 0.003
Livestock Trade 0.010* 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.003
Livestock 
Products 
0.008* 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004
Crop Value -0.025** 0.013 0.020** 0.009 0.007 0.011
Remittances 0.011 0.007 0.025*** 0.007 0.013** 0.006
Tea Price -0.209*** 0.067 -0.337*** 0.085 -0.092 0.079
Maize Price 0.060 0.058 0.029 0.043 0.091* 0.047
Aggregated Income Model 
Aggregated 
Income 
0.072*** 0.021 0.063*** 0.016 0.035** 0.017
Tea Price -0.238*** 0.062 -0.270*** 0.084 -0.076 0.080
Maize Price 0.105** 0.054 0.076** 0.037 0.122** 0.043
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of dietary diversity is 0.072 for the lower tercile, 0.063 for the middle tercile and 0.035 
for the upper tercile, each significant at the one percent, one percent and five percent 
levels, respectively.  Price elasticities, on the other hand, are much higher in 
magnitude.  The relatively higher estimated price elasticities likely points to issues of 
market access.  There is very little intertemporal variation in the prices measured.  
Most variation occurs cross-sectionally.  It therefore appears that improving market 
access may have substantial nutritional benefits for individuals in the study locations.  
 Despite the small magnitude of estimated income elasticities, the estimated 
source-specific income elasticities appear, statistically, quite different from each other 
and from those estimated for total income.  For the lower tercile, income elasticities 
for income from wages and salary and remittances are not statistically different from 
zero.  Income elasticities for income from livestock trade and livestock products are 
both significant at the 10% level.  The elasticity with respect to non-farm and non-
livestock trade and business income is significant at the one percent level and that with 
respect to crop value is significant at the five percent level.  The dietary diversity of 
individuals in the lower tercile appears to have the largest positive response to changes 
in income from trade and business and livestock trade with income elasticities of 
dietary diversity of 0.020 and 0.010, respectively.  Lower tercile individuals’ dietary 
diversity appears to have a negative response to changes in crop value with a 
statistically significant income elasticity of  -0.025.  As explained earlier, the arid and 
semi-arid lands of the study region are not well suited to crop production.  It is likely 
that households in the lower tercile are cultivating crops out of necessity and 
desperation, hence the negative sign on this elasticity estimate.  In the sample, crop 
value has a statistically significant negative correlation of –0.086 and –0.268 with 
trade and business income and remittances, respectively.  Both of these income 
sources have higher estimated elasticities of dietary diversity than other sources of 
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income.  Although the estimated income elasticity for remittances in not significant at 
the 10% level, it is significant at the 15% level, albeit with a very low point estimate 
of 0.01.  Therefore unless these households are cultivating a variety of crops it is 
unlikely that increases in crop value will increase their dietary diversity.  In fact of the 
38 observations that reported positive crop values in the lower tercile, 22 of those 
observations had a dietary diversity of only one.32 
 Income sources that appear to be the most important to the dietary diversity of 
individuals in the middle tercile are crop value and remittances.  The estimated 
elasticity with respect to crop value is 0.020 and is significant at the five percent level 
and that with respect to remittances is 0.025 and is significant at the one percent level.  
Elasticities estimated with respect to other income sources were not statistically 
different from zero for individuals in the middle tercile.  For individuals in the upper 
tercile, statistically significant income elasticities were those with respect to non-farm, 
non-livestock trade and business, wages and salary, and remittances with trade and 
business and remittances having a relatively larger influence over dietary diversity. 
 Estimated tea price elasticities were –0.209 in the lower tercile and –0.337 in 
the middle tercile, each significant at the one percent level.  The estimated tea price 
elasticity for the upper tercile was -0.092, however it was not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  As would be expected, the upper tercile is less price elastic than 
the other terciles.  The middle tercile, however, is more price elastic than the lower. 
 Unlike the tea price elasticities, which had the expected negative sign, the 
estimated maize price elasticities were positive, although they were not significantly 
different from zero for the lower and middle terciles.  Given the prominence of maize 
as a dietary staple in all of the study locations, the positive estimated elasticities are 
                                                 
32 A dietary diversity of one means that the individual only consumed one type of food or drink item 
over the 24-hour recall period.  However, they could have consumed that food or drink item multiple 
times during that period. 
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likely due to a substitution effect.  Rising maize prices will cause individuals to 
decrease their consumption of the staple good, maize, and to substitute it with other 
foods.  Unless individuals completely eliminate maize from their diet then this 
substitution effect would cause dietary diversity to increase. 
 There do seem to be differences in the relative magnitudes and significance of 
the estimated income elasticities for the various income sources.  In addition, the 
impacts of individual income sources on dietary diversity appear different from the 
impact of aggregated income.  However, we must test statistically for differences in 
dietary diversity responses to changes in various sources of income, particularly since 
the estimated income elasticities are very low. 
 A Wald test of hypothesis (6) rejects the equality of income source elasticities 
for each income tercile.  Equivalent income source elasticities is rejected at the at the 
5% level for the lower tercile and the 10% level for the middle and upper terciles with 
test statistics of (5) = 11.77, 10.46, and 10.01, respectively.  Differential responses 
of dietary diversity towards different income sources are thus confirmed statistically.  
The next step then is to explore possible explanations for this result. 
 
VI. Possible Explanations for Differential Responses 
 As discussed earlier, three possible explanations for this result exist in the 
literature:  missing markets for certain home produced commodities, intrahousehold 
dynamics of resource control and allocation, and mental accounting.  There is no way 
to explicitly test for mental accounting as the cause of the differential responses.  
However, missing markets and intrahousehold effects can be tested directly as 
explanations.  If both fail to account to account for the differential responses of dietary 
diversity to various income sources, then mental accounting is left as the residual 
explanation. 
66 
 Missing Markets and Non-Tradable Goods 
 Almost all households in the study area own livestock and thus produce milk.  
However, income earned from livestock products, which includes milk production, 
appears to be less important to dietary diversity than other income sources.  The 
estimated elasticity with respect to livestock production income is not statistically 
different from zero for the middle and upper terciles and is only 0.008 for the lower 
tercile.  Given the prominence of livestock products as an income source in this 
population (livestock products make up 34%, 48% and 49% of income in the lower, 
middle and upper terciles, respectively) one would expect it to play a larger role in the 
provision of basic necessities such as food, outside of milk. 
 A possible reason behind this result is that many pastoralist households might 
not participate in markets for livestock products, rendering those goods non-tradable.  
If the transaction costs associated with market-based exchange induce the household 
to be an autarkic milk producer and consumer, any increased income from production 
of that non-tradable good necessarily expands only the quantity of milk that household 
consumes, not the variety of foods it consumes.  Therefore production of milk and 
other livestock products may do little to enhance dietary diversity. 
 In order to test the possibility that household-specific non-tradable home-
produced goods causes the deferential dietary diversity responses observed in the full 
sample, equation (5) was re-estimated using just the sub-sample of observations where 
households recorded positive milk sales, as opposed to just positive milk production.  
Those who sell milk necessarily treat milk as tradable.  By focusing only on these 
observations, we excluded any household-period observations for which milk might 
have been non-tradable.  In addition, positive milk sales indicate that households 
participated in a more formal market setting in settlements where they were not only 
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able to participate in the market for milk but also would have the opportunity to 
participate in markets for other goods as well. 
 Restricting the sample resulted in a much smaller data subset.  The milk 
market sub-sample has only 327 of the full sample’s 2,089 observations covering only 
127 households as opposed to 318 households in the full sample.  The small sample 
size was too restrictive to estimate equation (5) controlling for the different income 
quantiles.  Therefore, in order to conserve degrees of freedom, equations (1) and (2) 
were estimated, with dummy variables for the middle and upper tercile left in as 
intercept shifters only.  There are no systematic differences in the income composition 
between the three income terciles in this sub-sample. 
 Descriptive statistics on the milk market sample can be found in Tables (5) and 
(6), where Table (6) provides descriptive statistics only on households in the sample 
that earned positive amounts of the particular source of income being described.  In 
addition to pooling the income terciles, the seasonal dummy variables were dropped to 
conserve degrees of freedom.  The seasonal variables were not statistically significant 
and are adequately represented by the average rainfall variable.  Dropping the seasonal 
dummy variables did not substantially change the estimated parameters but it did 
increase the precision of the estimates. 
 Table (7) reports parameter estimates for the milk market sub-sample.  In the 
aggregated income model, equation (1), the total income elasticity of dietary diversity 
is 0.042 and is not statistically significant at standard levels (p = 0.110).  When 
income is disaggregated and equation (2) is estimated with the milk market sub-
sample, the estimated income elasticities again differ by source as well as from the 
total income elasticity.  Income from remittances and livestock trade appear to be most 
important to dietary diversity in this sample.  The dietary diversity elasticity with 
respect to remittances is statistically significant at the five percent level with a value of  
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Table 2.5: Milk Market Sub-Sample Summary Statistics 
 N %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lower Tercile 74    
Total Income  1.00 3839.32 2376.25 475.45 12141.47
Trade and 
Business 
 0.02 
(0.08) 
90.55 323.50 0 1799
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.00 
(0.01) 
6.76 46.14 0 380
Livestock Trade  0.10 
(0.20) 
515.35 1111.26 0 4500
Livestock 
Products 
 0.64 
(0.30) 
2416.99 1754.88 0 7278.93
Crop Value  0.01 
(0.03) 
22.68 137.64 0 918.33
Remittances  0.24 
(0.25) 
786.99 870.53 0 3596.24
Middle Tercile 82    
Total Income  1.00 8208.03 5930.26 805.94 33705.5
Trade and 
Business 
 0.05 
(0.10) 
408.69 767.77 0 3599
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.01 
(0.06) 
168.93 792.42 0 5661.9
Livestock Trade  0.16 
(0.25) 
1821.00 3341.54 0 16100
Livestock 
Products 
 0.57 
(0.29) 
4541.06 3724.89 0 18250
Crop Value  0.03 
(0.14) 
178.35 799.54 0 4845
Remittances  0.17 
(0.21) 
1090.00 1535.22 0 8348.16
Upper Tercile 155    
Total Income  1.00 14592.8
5
7957.63 1115.8
2 
34224
Trade and 
Business 
 0.09 
(0.15) 
1168.16 2073.92 0 13398.3
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.03 
(0.12) 
552.36 2780.00 0   24000
Livestock Trade  0.11 
(0.18) 
1565.38 2608.95 0 12500
Livestock 
Products 
 0.63 
(0.29) 
9676.16 7408.42 0 32850
Crop Value  0.02 
(0.09) 
333.80 1746.81 0 17864.4
Remittances  0.12 
(0.16) 
1296.99 1623.12 0 9487.73
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Table 2.6: Milk Market Sub-Sample Summary Statistics on Positive Income Earners 
 N %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lower Tercile       
Total Income 74 1.00 3839.32 2376.25 475.45 12141.47 
Trade and 
Business 
10 0.15 
(0.18) 
670.03 646.09 35.80 1799 
Wages and 
Salary 
2 0.07 
(0.05) 
250 183.85 120 380 
Livestock Trade 19 0.38 
(0.23) 
2007.17 1359.25 358.02 4500 
Livestock 
Products 
67 0.70 
(0.23) 
2669.51 1649.83 475.45 7278.93 
Crop Value 2 0.23 
(0.02) 
839.17 111.96 760.00 918.33 
Remittances 59 0.30 
(0.25) 
987.07 867.71 44.66 3596.24 
Middle Tercile       
Total Income 82 1.00 8208.03 5930.26 805.94 33705.5 
Trade and 
Business 
37 0.11 
(0.13) 
905.75 929.30 39 3599 
Wages and 
Salary 
5 0.23 
(0.14) 
2770.38 1925.27 260 5661.9 
Livestock Trade 32 0.42 
(0.24) 
4666.32 3933.18 400 16100 
Livestock 
Products 
80 0.59 
(0.28) 
4654.58 3700.13 380 18250 
Crop Value 7 0.33 
(0.39) 
2089.24 1993.07 75 4845 
Remittances 66 0.21 
(0.21) 
1354.25 1604.28 1.49 8348.16 
Upper Tercile       
Total Income 155 1.00 14592.85 7957.63 1115.82 34224 
Trade and 
Business 
107 0.13 
(0.16) 
1692.19 2313.80   39 13398.3 
Wages and 
Salary 
15 0.28 
(0.27) 
5707.69 7313.39 100 24000 
Livestock Trade 75 0.23 
(0.20) 
3235.11 2947.95 350 12500 
Livestock 
Products 
147 0.67 
(0.26) 
10202.76 7244.48 302.94 32850 
Crop Value 12 0.24 
(0.21) 
4311.58 4899.91 459.17   17864.4 
Remittances 122 0.15 
(0.16) 
1647.82 1664.38 18.87 9487.73 
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Table 2.7: Milk Market Sub-Sample Elasticity Estimates 
N=311 
Groups=127 
** and * significant at the five and ten percent level, respectively 
 Elasticity Standard Error P-value 
Disaggregated Income Model 
Trade & Business 0.011 0.019 0.545 
Wages & Salary -0.010 0.009 0.255 
Livestock Trade 0.009* 0.005 0.100 
Livestock Products -0.006 0.007 0.371 
Crop Value 0.006 0.018 0.765 
Remittances 0.021** 0.010 0.040 
Tea Price -0.077 0.098 0.431 
Maize Price -0.094 0.100 0.344 
Aggregated Income Model 
Aggregated Income 0.042 0.027 0.110 
Tea Price 0.018 0.027 0.848 
Maize Price -0.084 0.093 0.411 
 
0.021.  The elasticity with respect to livestock trade is only just significant at the 10% 
level with a magnitude of 0.009.  Other income source elasticities are not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  However, this might be due to the small sub-sample 
size.  As can be seen in Table (6), of the 311 observations in this sub-sample only 
livestock products and remittances have more than 200 observations of positive 
reported earnings.  Only 154 observations reported positive earnings in trade and 
business and 126 in livestock trade.  There were very few income earners in wages 
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and salary and crops with only 22 and 21 observations reporting positive earnings in 
those income sources, respectively. 
 Although livestock products make up a large portion of the income earned in 
the sub-sample, its estimated elasticity is not only not statistically significant, it is also 
negative.  Livestock product income is negatively correlated with remittances in this 
sample.  Thus even though the sample has been restricted such that milk is necessarily 
treated as tradable, livestock product income still has little, and possibly negative, 
effect on dietary diversity.  The large standard errors of some of the elasticity 
estimates are likely due to the small size of the milk market sub-sample. 
 A Wald Test testing the equivalence of income source elasticities only weakly 
fails to reject the null hypothesis in hypothesis (1) with a test statistic of (5) = 8.99 
and a p-value of 0.1097.  Based on the value of their estimated elasticities, income 
sources that appear important to dietary diversity in the full sample, namely 
remittances and trade and business, also appear to be important in the milk market 
sub-sample.  Additionally, the relative differences between the estimated elasticities in 
the milk market sub-sample are as large as those in the full sample.  However the 
standard errors are also relatively larger in the milk market sample than in the full 
sample.  This combined with the loss of degrees of freedom may contribute to the 
Wald Test’s failure to reject the null hypothesis of equality of income source 
elasticities.  Therefore, although the Wald Test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
equivalent income elasticities across income sources, it does so very weakly and there 
still seems to be evidence that dietary diversity does respond differently to changes in 
different income sources.  However, missing markets may at least partly explain the 
differential dietary diversity responses observed in the full sample. 
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Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation 
 Many pastoralist households in the study region practice polygamy.  In 
addition, households also often include extended family members such as parents, 
siblings of the household head or his spouse(s), and adult children.  Therefore 
intrahousehold processes of bargaining and resource allocation could provide a 
reasonable explanation for the differential responses of dietary diversity to different 
income sources.  In such households, preferences surely vary among members.  So if 
different income sources are associated with different household members, it would 
result in the differential dietary responses across income sources that we find. 
 In order to test for intrahousehold effects as the cause for differential 
responses, a method similar to that performed by Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) was 
adopted.  Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) restricted their analysis to single-adult 
households in order to test whether intrahousehold effects cause cash income to 
impact household consumption differently than food stamp income.  We likewise 
restrict the data to households where the household head was unmarried.  Since many 
households also house extended family members the sample was further restricted to 
households in which the household head was single and the oldest non-head household 
member was no older than 10 years less than the age of the head.  By restricting the 
sub-sample to only households with one adult, this necessarily excludes any 
households that are affected by processes of intrahousehold bargaining, since only one 
member in the household has any significant bargaining power.33  
Due to the culture of the area the vast majority of the households in the single-
adult sub-sample are female-headed households.  In fact, there are just 13 observations 
on only two male-headed households included in the single adult sub-sample.  The 
                                                 
33 This of course assumes that children have no substantial or systematic bargaining power over 
resource allocation within the household.  While we cannot test this assumption, we feel safe in making 
it. 
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female household heads in the sub-sample are often widowed or divorced and almost 
half of the observations in this sub-sample are in the lower income tercile. 
 Summary statistics on this sub-sample are provided in Tables 8 and 9.  Table 9 
provides descriptive statistics on households in this sub-sample that reported positive 
earnings of the particular income described.  As with the milk market sub-sample, 
limiting the data to only single adult households resulted in a much smaller sub-
sample and was too restrictive on degrees of freedom to control for income terciles.  
The single adult sub-sample has only 508 of the 2089 observations in the full sample 
and only 75 of the 318 households in the full sample.  Therefore, again to preserve 
degrees of freedom, equations (2) and (1) were estimated in which the income terciles 
are pooled. 
 Table 10 reports parameter estimates for equations (2) and (1) using the single 
adult sub-sample.  In the aggregated income model, the total income elasticity of 
dietary diversity is 0.054 and is statistically significant at the one percent level.  But as 
with the milk market sub-sample and full sample, certain income sources appear to be 
more important to dietary diversity than others when income is disaggregated and 
equation (2) is estimated with the single adult sub-sample.  The most influential 
income sources on dietary diversity are trade and business and wages and salary, with 
statistically significant estimated elasticities of 0.014 and 0.017, respectively.  Other 
income source elasticities are not statistically different from zero.  A Wald Test again 
rejects the null hypothesis of equal income elasticities of dietary diversity across 
income sources at the 10% level with a test statistic of (5)=9.68 (p = 0.0847).  Thus, 
even after controlling for intrahousehold effects, there still exist differential responses 
of dietary diversity to changes in various sources of income. 
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Table 2.8:  Single Adult Sub-Sample Summary Statistics 
 N %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lower Tercile 245      
Total Income  1.00 3167.48 2982.16 450 17721.67 
Trade and 
Business 
 0.06 
(0.17) 
213.06 702.31 0 5700 
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.06 
(0.18) 
196.68 1058.26 0 15000 
Livestock Trade  0.11 
(0.26) 
593.14 1648.16 0 10010.66 
Livestock 
Products 
 0.31 
(0.38) 
976.57 1651.05 0   10149.7 
Crop Value  0.03 
(0.14) 
112.54 571.46 0 6004 
Remittances  0.44 
(0.39) 
  1075.48   1533.44 0 13182.44 
Middle Tercile 189      
Total Income  1.00 5902.04 6313.76 425   33705.5 
Trade and 
Business 
 0.06 
(0.15) 
196.24 494.50 0 4500 
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.03 
(0.13) 
240.88 1429.58 0 18000 
Livestock Trade  0.14 
(0.26) 
1501.77 3749.33  0 30000 
Livestock 
Products 
 0.46 
(0.37) 
2902.36 4217.33 0 24405.83 
Crop Value  0.02 
(0.12) 
182.20 1443.41 0   18120 
Remittances  0.29 
(0.34) 
878.59 943.82 0 6095.55 
Upper Tercile 74      
Total Income  1.00 15309.77 9510.25 1486 34224 
Trade and 
Business 
 0.14 
(0.28) 
1766.96 4691.95 0 27000 
Wages and 
Salary 
 0.28 
(0.34) 
5670.15 8158.42 0 25500 
Livestock Trade  0.06 
(0.11) 
784.05 1541.92 0 8800 
Livestock 
Products 
 0.32 
(0.31) 
4388.59 6288.19 0 32850 
Crop Value  0.02 
(0.13) 
445 3021.87 0 25080 
Remittances  0.19 
(0.20) 
2255.01 2857.64 0 15976.88 
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Table 2.9:  Single Adult Sub-Sample Summary Statistics on Positive Income 
Earners 
 
 N %  of Household 
Income 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Lower Tercile       
Total Income 245 1.00 3167.48 2982.16 450 17721.67 
Trade and 
Business 
44 0.31 
(0.28) 
1186.37 1271.72 46.92 5700 
Wages and 
Salary 
33 0.43 
(0.27) 
1460.22 2576.16 100 15000 
Livestock Trade 45 0.59 
(0.30) 
3229.33 2521.36 400 10010.66 
Livestock 
Products 
127 0.60 
(0.32) 
1883.93 1885.71 182.5 10149.7 
Crop Value 17 0.39 
(0.36) 
1621.92 1542.42 29.42 6004 
Remittances 196 0.55 
(0.36) 
1344.35 1605.93 36 13182.44 
Middle Tercile       
Total Income 189 1.00 5902.04 6313.76 425   33705.5 
Trade and 
Business 
56 0.19 
(0.22) 
662.30 722.19 30 4500 
Wages and 
Salary 
31 0.21 
(0.25) 
1468.61 3308.16 50 18000 
Livestock Trade 54 0.48 
(0.26) 
5256.20 5455.08 300 30000 
Livestock 
Products 
139 0.62 
(0.30) 
3946.37 4481.08 334.52 24405.83 
Crop Value 8 0.48 
(0.34) 
4304.54 5972.88 125 18120 
Remittances 147 0.38 
(0.34) 
1129.61 928.19   48 6095.55 
Upper Tercile       
Total Income 74 1.00 15309.77 9510.25 1486 34224 
Trade and 
Business 
46 0.22 
(0.33) 
2842.5 5708.51 30   27000 
Wages and 
Salary 
34 0.60 
(0.25) 
12340.91 7900.66 1000 25500 
Livestock Trade 24 0.18 
(0.12) 
2417.5 1850.79 700    8800 
Livestock 
Products 
62 0.38 
(0.30) 
5238.00 6542.00 255.5 32850 
Crop Value 3 0.53 
(0.44) 
10976.67 12645.3 650 25080 
Remittances 72 0.20 
(0.20) 
2317.65   2872.09 175 15976.88 
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Table 2.10: Single Adult Sub-Sample Elasticity Estimates 
N=508 
Groups=75 
*** and ** significant at the one and five percent level, respectively 
 Elasticity Standard Error P-value 
Disaggregated Income Model 
Trade & Business 0.014** 0.006 0.019 
Wages & Salary 0.017*** 0.005 0.001 
Livestock Trade -0.005 0.006 0.388 
Livestock Products 0.006 0.006 0.273 
Crop Value -0.005 0.013 0.670 
Remittances 0.005 0.008 0.524 
Tea Price -0.247** 0.122 0.042 
Maize Price 0.081 0.068 0.234 
Aggregated Income Model 
Aggregated Income 0.054*** 0.021 0.009 
Tea Price -0.254** 0.121 0.035 
Maize Price 0.083 0.064 0.198 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 We find evidence of differential dietary diversity responses to changes in 
various income sources.  The differential impacts of various income sources on dietary 
diversity persist after controlling for intrahousehold effects as a possible explanation.  
Thus intrahousehold processes of resource control and allocation fail to fully account 
for this result.  Statistical tests failed to fully reject household-specific missing markets 
as an explanation for the differential effects.  However, the failure to reject was weak 
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and there still appears to be evidence of differential effects after controlling for 
missing markets.  Thus both intrahousehold effects and market failures appear unable 
to fully account for the differential responses of dietary diversity across income 
sources.  This leaves mental accounting as the residual explanation. 
 For the most part, research on the nutrition-income relationship in developing 
countries has investigated the nutritional impacts of changes in total household 
income.  However, where income comes from may change how it is used in the 
household.  Therefore, it may be more accurate to examine the impact of different 
sources of income on nutritional status rather than merely aggregate income.  If 
income source matters to how households respond nutritionally to changes in income, 
then this has important implications for how the relationship between income and 
nutrition is assessed.  Income generating programs concerned with the food intake of 
poor households may be ineffective, or even counter productive, if they are not 
targeting appropriate income sources.  Recognizing and better understanding the 
consumption behavior of poor households as it relates to various sources of income 
could substantially improve policy targeting and development efforts on the whole.  
Treating all income equally may lead to inadequate assessments of income-
consumption relationships.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF DIETARY DIVERSITY IN EAST 
AFRICAN PASTORALIST HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 Nutritional welfare is an individual, not household, characteristic.  While the 
average nutritional status of the household can be one of the largest determinants of 
the well-being of its members, nutritional well-being is individually experienced.  
Therefore development policies targeting nutrition are typically more concerned with 
their possible implications for individual welfare than for household-, community- or 
national-level aggregates.  The household, though, may be one of the most important 
institutions influencing individual nutritional welfare.  Consequently, an 
understanding of how households allocate resources to their individual members is 
essential in evaluating income generation and pricing policies.  Deaton (1997) points 
out that if members in a household are treated differently, but equality is assumed, 
then true inequality is understated and social welfare is overstated.  Haddad and 
Kanbur (1990) show that the ranking order of different socioeconomic and geographic 
groups by their nutritional status can change depending on whether individual- or 
household-level data are used. 
 There is a large literature in development economics evaluating whether and to 
what extent the intrahousehold allocation of food differs according to demographic 
groups such as gender and age.  To make any definitive welfare statements concerning 
demographic groups within the household, one must not only consider relative levels 
of nutrient intake, but also the relative volatility of one group’s nutrient consumption 
versus another group’s.  For example, if one group has a high mean but also a high 
variance of food intake, then that group may not necessarily be nutritionally better off 
83 
 than another group whose average food intake is lower yet less volatile over time.  
Thus disparities in mean nutritional intake alone among different household 
demographic groups do not necessarily signify disparities in nutritional welfare. 
    
I. Intrahousehold Allocation of Nutrition 
 Food allocation within the household has been a widely studied facet of 
intrahousehold distribution.34  Evidence for the existence and extent of intrahousehold 
inequality in nutritional well-being is mixed.  While a number of studies have found a 
pro-male bias in intrahousehold nutrient distribution, this result has predominately 
been found in northern India and Bangladesh.  Outside of these regions evidence for 
male bias in food allocation is scarce (Haddad et al., 1996). 
 In a study of households in Bangladesh, Pitt et al. (1990) find that men have 
both a higher mean and a higher variance of caloric consumption than do women.  
They also find that adult males are much more likely to participate in energy-intensive 
activities than are women.  Thus, despite adult males’ higher average calorie 
consumption, their high energy expenditure results in a tax on their endowments that 
exceeds that on adult females.  Therefore, the authors conclude that these households 
appear to be more inequality averse than male-biased or income-maximizing in their 
intrahousehold food allocation behaviors. 
 Dercon and Krishnan (2000) examined intrahousehold disparities in Ethiopian 
households by looking at whether these households engaged in complete risk sharing.  
They found in all study locations save one that households fully shared the risk of 
unpredicted illness.  The exception was poor households in southern Ethiopia where 
women were not fully insured against unpredicted illness while men were. 
                                                 
34 For a good review of this literature see Haddad et al. (1996). 
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  A number of studies have examined the existence and magnitude of 
intrahousehold inequality by comparing the income and price elasticities of household 
resource consumption among different demographic groups.  If one household 
demographic group’s consumption is more income or price elastic than another’s, then 
this might be indicative of greater volatility in their consumption.  Some studies have 
found that consumption and human capital investment are less price and income 
elastic for more “favored” demographic groups than less favored ones (Alderman and 
Gertler 1997, Behrman 1988, Behrman and Deolalikar 1990). 
 For example, in a study of households in rural South India, Behrman and 
Deolalikar (1990) find that females’ nutrient intake is more price elastic than that of 
males.  The authors conclude that these higher elasticities could leave women and girls 
vulnerable during times of food shortages.  Alderman and Gertler (1997) develop a 
theoretical model in which human capital investments are more income and price 
elastic for less favored household demographic groups.  They then show empirically 
that girls’ demand for healthcare services is more price and income elastic than that of 
boys in a study of Pakistani households. 
 Mangyo (2008), on the other hand, demonstrates theoretically that higher 
income and price elasticities do not necessarily indicate weaker household status.  He 
explains that as household income increases, the rate at which resource allocation to 
individuals increases depends on the rates at which the marginal utility and 
productivity of one household member fall relative to that of others.  Among Chinese 
households, he finds that the nutrient intake of females is less income elastic than that 
of males when controlling for potentially confounding factors.  In fact, he found that 
prime-age males had the highest income elasticity of all the gender and age groups 
studied. 
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  Comparing income or price elasticities of consumption among demographic 
groups within the household has been widely used as a way of making intrahousehold 
welfare statements.  It has often been implied that an individual whose consumption is 
relatively more price or income elastic is worse off because this indicates that his 
consumption is more volatile.  Certainly, awareness of individual-level income and 
price elasticities allows for better and more informed evaluations of the welfare 
impacts of income and price changes.  However, elasticities may be inadequate for 
making any definitive welfare comparisons. 
 As discussed, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) found that the nutrient intake of 
females in their study was more price elastic than that of males.  They surmised that 
while this may mean that females enjoy a disproportionate share of nutritional reward 
when food prices are falling, it also means that their nutritional burden is greater when 
food prices are rising during lean seasons and droughts.  The authors conclude that this 
leaves females more vulnerable to malnutrition and starvation. 
 This highlights an important point.  Whether disproportionately high income or 
price elasticities are a blessing or a curse depends on the direction of changes in 
income or prices.  For example, a high income elasticity of consumption is beneficial 
to the individual when the household is enjoying robust income growth and a burden 
during less favorable times.  Unless models control somehow for this directional 
distinction, income and price elasticities alone may be inadequate for making any 
definitive intrahousehold welfare statements. 
This paper examines whether there are intrahousehold nutritional disparities 
among demographic groups in pastoralist households in northern Kenya and southern 
Ethiopia.  It also explores whether there are substantive disparities in how household 
demographic groups respond nutritionally to changes in household income and food 
commodity prices.  Section III describes the data and setting of this study.  In Section 
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 IV we build an empirical model of nutrition that estimates income elasticities 
separately for when income is above and below the household’s intertemporal mean 
income.  This model accounts for the directional movements of income and thus 
makes elasticities more appropriate for welfare comparisons.  In Section V we plot 
nonparametric regressions comparing the dietary diversity of household heads in our 
data sample to that of wives, adult sons and adult daughters.  Section VI discusses our 
estimation and results.  In section VII we conduct distributional tests among simulated 
nutritional cohort-specific distributions in order to infer demographic welfare 
orderings.  Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Data and Setting 
 The data come from a comprehensive set of panel data collected by the USAID 
Global Collaborative Research Support Program (GL CRSP) project “Improving 
Pastoral Risk Management on East African Rangelands” (PARIMA).  Households 
were surveyed in three locations in southern Ethiopia and six in northern Kenya,35 all 
in one livestock production and marketing region (Barrett et al., 2008).  While some 
households may be involved in activities such as trade, wage labor, or, to a very 
limited extent, crop cultivation, the primary economic activities for most households 
in the area are centered around livestock. 
 Pastoralism allows households to be opportunistic in these arid and semi-arid 
lands where uncertainties in rainfall make primary production risky (Coppock 1994).  
Very few households do not own any livestock.  In fact, only 2 out of 212 households 
in the sample did not own any livestock over the entire study period.  Average herd 
                                                 
35 The six study locations in Kenya were Dirib Gumbo, Kargi, Logologo, Ng’ambo, North Horr, and 
Sugata Marmar.  In Ethiopia the study sites were Dida Hara,  Finchawa, and Qorate.  
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 size in the sample is approximately 17.87 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU).36  
Livestock products make up roughly 48% of total income in the sample population 
and livestock trade makes up another 17%.   Descriptive statistics on households in the 
sample population can be found in Table 1. 
 Polygamy is widely practiced in the study area.  Household heads in these 
communities are generally male.  Female household heads are usually widows.  Girls 
typically marry young and then go to live either in their husband’s household or that of 
his parents.  This explains the relatively small number of adult co-resident daughters 
in the sample population.  While numerous household members may participate in 
livestock care, herding is primarily the responsibility of sons. 
 In each study location 30 households were randomly sampled, resulting in a 
total of 337 households surveyed37.  From each household, the household head was 
surveyed along with up to two non-head, adult household members.  The non-head 
adults include one wife,38 if there is a co-resident spouse, along with another co-
resident adult member such as a parent, sibling, or adult child of the household head.  
Because the focus of this paper is on intrahousehold distribution, households in which 
only the head was surveyed were excluded.  Additionally, households were excluded 
in which the only non-head member surveyed was not a wife, son or daughter.  There 
were not enough observations on individuals in other, smaller demographic cohorts to 
generate meaningful estimations.  For the same reason, observations on non-head 
individuals other than wives or adult children of the head were also excluded even if 
other members of their household were included. 
                                                 
36 TLU is a standard measure for aggregating livestock herds across various species based on equivalent 
average bodyweight;  1 TLU = 1 cattle = 0.7 camel = 0.1 sheep or goat. 
37 Due to attrition, interruption and period-specific missing observations of particular variables for 
certain individuals or communities, the number of observations per survey period ranges from 231 to 
412.  Also, due to some known measurement error, the top and bottom five percent of observations over 
the observed income distribution were dropped. 
38Wives surveyed may be a first, second, third or fourth wife. 
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Table 3.1:  Household Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Full Sample   (212)     
Income 10221.63 6530.37 829.31 34598.63 
Herd Size (TLU) 17.87 35.59 0 385.94 
Household Size 7.43 3.34 1 23 
Adult/literacy school 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Primary School 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Secondary School 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Lower Tercile   (71)     
Income 4646.30 1571.69 829.31 9436.65 
Herd Size (TLU) 11.57 45.35 0 385.94 
Household Size 6.88 2.64 1.57 15.65 
Adult/literacy school 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Primary School 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Secondary School 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Middle Tercile  (71)     
Income 8439.44 1970.91 4521.08 12256.91 
Herd Size (TLU) 16.41 28.51 .34 233.57 
Household Size 7.35 3.73 2 20.96 
Adult/literacy school 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Primary School 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Secondary School 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Upper Tercile   (70)     
Income 17684.24 5675.50 9422.38 34598.63 
Herd Size (TLU) 25.74 29.25 2.2 215.76 
Household Size 7.74 3.18 2 16 
Adult/literacy school 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Primary School 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Secondary School 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 
 Surveys were conducted in March 2000 to gather baseline information and 
then quarterly from June 2000 to June 2002, resulting in 10 quarterly observations.39  
Survey intervals were chosen to correspond to the bimodal rainfall patterns of the 
study region.  Further details on these data are provided in Barrett et al. (2008). 
                                                 
39 The March 2000 survey was used only for baseline information on households and individuals. 
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  The baseline survey provides information on individual and household 
characteristics such as age, sex, household size, education of head, and to which 
household demographic group the individual belongs.  The repeated quarterly surveys 
give information on household income earned over the past quarter, community level 
food prices and average rainfall.  The repeated quarterly surveys also ask surveyed 
individuals to recall their own food and beverage consumption over the past 24 hours. 
This information was used to calculate the dietary diversity of each individual 
in each period.  Dietary diversity is defined here as the number of unique food and 
drink items consumed over the recall period.  For example, if an individual consumed 
three helpings of maize, one helping of beans, and two servings of tea with milk, his 
dietary diversity count would be four. 
Descriptive statistics on dietary diversity by household cohort and income 
tercile40 can be found in Table 2.  Looking at the descriptive statistics alone, 
household heads do not appear favored over other household members in terms of 
dietary diversity.  In the full sample, as well as in the lower and upper income terciles, 
daughters have the highest mean dietary diversity, sons have the lowest, and there do 
not seem to be any statistically or substantively significant differences between the 
mean dietary diversity of heads and wives.  In the middle tercile sons still have the 
lowest mean dietary diversity but daughters have a lower mean dietary diversity than 
that of their parents.  One possible explanation for daughters enjoying a higher 
average dietary diversity than other household members is that a daughter’s health 
represents an investment for the household.  Pastoralist families in this region typically 
receive a bride price of several TLU for their daughters when they are married.  
Therefore, a healthy daughter could be valuable to the household above her inherent 
value as a family member. 
                                                 
40 Income terciles are based on households’ intertemporal mean income. 
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Table 3.2:  Dietary Diversity Descriptive Statistics 
 Number 
of 
Groups N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Full Sample      
Head 212 1449 3.28 1.57 1 8 
Wife 178 1106 3.36 1.64 1 9 
Son 71 371 2.82 1.65 1 8 
Daughter 31 124 3.49 1.66 1 8 
Lower  Income Tercile      
Head 71 509 2.73 1.45 1 8 
Wife 54 325 2.71 1.55 1 8 
Son 24 130 2.42 1.54 1 8 
Daughter 12 54 3.31 1.60 1 7 
Middle Income Tercile      
Head 71 512 3.24 1.53 1 8 
Wife 63 416 3.39 1.59 1 7 
Son 20 120 2.71 1.41 1 8 
Daughter 7 32 3.19 1.89 1 7 
Upper Income Tercile      
Head 70 428 3.99 1.47 1 8 
Wife 61 365 3.91 1.56 1 9 
Son 27 121 3.37 1.83 1 8 
Daughter 12 38 4.00 1.45 1 8 
  
Sons, on the other hand, have a markedly lower mean dietary diversity than 
other household members.  Sons are typically the household members most active in 
herding.  Thus much of their day is spent away from the home in grazing areas where 
the supply of a variety of foods throughout the day is quite limited.  This might lower 
their dietary diversity relative to other household members who spend more time at the 
home or close to towns. 
 
III. Model and Econometric Specification 
 The main objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of disparities in 
nutritional welfare among demographic groups within the household.  We estimate a 
reduced form individual-level function in which nutrition depends on household 
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 income and food prices, as well as other individual- and household-specific 
characteristics.  Dietary diversity is used as the dependent variable measure of 
nutritional status.  Previous studies have often used nutrient intake or food 
expenditures as a measure of nutritional status.  However, both of these measures 
suffer from a number of qualitative and quantitative problems.41  In reaction to these 
issues, dietary diversity has been proposed as an alternative indicator of dietary quality 
and food security (Arimond and Ruel 2004, Hatloy et al. 1998, Hoddinott and 
Yohannes 2002, Ogle et al. 2001, Onyango et al. 1998, Ruel 2002, Ruel 2003, 
Torheim et al. 2004).  While the PARIMA surveys do not have good nutrient intake or 
availability information, they do provide good data on dietary diversity. 
 Dietary diversity is here defined as the number of unique food and drink items 
consumed over a 24-hour recall period.  Lack of dietary diversity is especially 
problematic in poor communities in developing countries.  A diverse diet has long 
been associated with good nutritional status.  Indeed, a number of studies have shown 
dietary diversity to be highly correlated with dietary quality and nutrient adequacy 
(Arimond and Ruel 2004, Hatloy et al. 1998, Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002, Ogle et 
al. 2001, Onyango et al. 1998, Torheim et al. 2004).  Studies have also found a 
consistent and positive association between child growth and dietary diversity 
(Arimond and Ruel 2004, Onyango et al. 1998).  Dietary diversity is also unlikely to 
suffer from the same measurement errors and bias problems42 that have been 
problematic in many of the more conventional measures of nutritional status 
(Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002, Strauss and Thomas 1995).  Consequently dietary 
diversity shows much promise as an indicator of dietary quality and is used here as the 
dependent variable. 
                                                 
41 See Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002) for a discussion of these 
problems. 
42 See footnote # 41. 
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    Because we are interested in intrahousehold differences, we employ dummy 
variables indicating membership in specific household demographic cohorts.  These 
dummy variables are included as intercept shifters as well as interacted with income 
and price variables to allow nutritional responses to changes in these variables to vary 
among different cohorts.  The log-linear approximation of nutrition at time t for 
individual i, living in household h, located in village v, and belonging to household 
cohort c is: 
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where 
i indexes the individual, 
h indexes the household, 
v indexes the location or village, 
t indexes the time period, 
N indicates level of nutrition as proxied by dietary diversity, 
Y is household income, 
P is the price of commodity g, 
X is individual-specific characteristic j, 
Z is household-specific characteristic l, 
V is village- or location-specific characteristic k, 
H is a dummy variable indicating membership in household cohort c, 
 is an unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effect and 
 is the iid normally distributed disturbance term with mean zero and variance 
one. 
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 Because the model is in partial log-log form, the parameters c andc capture cohort-
specific income and price elasticities of nutrition, respectively. 
 In our econometric specification, income is aggregated from six different 
sources:  income earned from non-farm and non-livestock trade and business such as 
crafts, firewood and water; income earned from wages and salary; income earned from 
livestock trade; the value of livestock products produced (e.g. meat, milk and hides 
and skin); the value of crops harvested; and net remittances, which includes the value 
of cash and in kind gifts as well as food aid.43  Village level maize and tea prices are 
included in the estimation.  Maize and tea are by far the most important purchased 
food staples in the study region.44  Individual-specific characteristics included are 
baseline age and demographic cohort indicator variables.  The household member 
cohorts are male head, wife, adult co-resident son and adult co-resident daughter 
(hereafter simply “son” and “daughter”).  The cohort variables necessarily control for 
an individual’s gender.  The male head of the household is the baseline cohort in our 
analyses.   
Other time-invariant individual-specific characteristics are captured in , the 
individual-level fixed-effect parameter.  Dummy variables indicating whether the 
household head has completed primary school, secondary school, or an adult 
education or literacy program are included as household-specific variables.  Average 
rainfall over the past quarter is included as a time-varying village characteristic.  To 
control for time-invariant, location-specific characteristics, we include geographic 
dummy variables, with Sugata Marmar excluded as the baseline. 
 This model allows for mean nutrition levels as well as income and price 
elasticities of nutrition to differ by cohort, as has been found previously.  However, it 
                                                 
43 For details on how each income sources was constructed see Barrett et al. (2008). 
44 Milk is another important food staple in the study area.  However, since almost all households own 
livestock it is predominately self-provided rather than purchased. 
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 does not make any distinctions for when having a relatively higher elasticity is 
beneficial or burdensome.  As noted above, a higher income elasticity has positive 
welfare implications when household income is rising, but negative welfare 
implications when it is falling.  In other words, an individual in the household with a 
relatively higher income elasticity when household income is growing implies more 
rapid nutritional gains for that individual.  On the other hand, having a higher income 
elasticity than other household members when income is contracting, implies that that 
individual suffers to a greater degree than others. 
 In order to address this shortcoming, we modify equation (1) to allow cohort-
specific income elasticities to differ depending on whether household income is above 
or below its intertemporal mean. 45  If current household income is above the 
household’s intertemporal mean, then it is logical to think that current income changes 
are directionally positive and thus having a higher income elasticity is individually 
beneficial.  If household income falls below its mean then it is likewise logical to think 
that current income changes are directionally negative and thus a higher income 
elasticity is burdensome.  This results in the following model. 
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45 The model can be similarly be modified to allow for differing price elasticities when food prices are 
above and below their intertemporal mean.  In this particular study however, there was not enough 
intertemporal variation in village-level food prices to make this modification meaningful.  Most 
variation in food prices was experienced spatially over the two and one half years of data. 
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 where hvY  is the intertemporal mean of household income in household h in location v 
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 Thus the income elasticity of nutrition for cohort d when household income is 
bove its intertemporal mean will be: 
(3) 
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where Cd 1 .   
 This approach allows for the possibility of making nutritional welfare 
comparisons within the household based on state-dependent as well as cohort-specific
income elasticity estimates.  A finding that members of household cohort A have a 
higher income elasticity than members of cohort B when household income is ab
its mean and a lower one when household inco
B 31
 
ove 
me is below its mean would indicate 
 
rs of cohort A have a higher income elasticity 
than those in cohort B when income is both above and below its mean, then no 
lfare comp
 Intrahousehold differences in nutritional response to income shocks can be 
tested with the following hypothesis: 
favorable intrahousehold welfare implications for individuals in cohort A relative to
those in cohort B.  However, if membe
definitive we arisons can be made. 
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(5) HO: ji 22    and ji 33    for all ji   
 HA: 22    anji d  for all  ji 33   ji   
 
 We c tan test whe her household cohorts exhibit symmetrical nutritional 
me changes occurring above and below household mean income with 
the following hypothesis: 
O
al status responds asymmetrically to changes in income occurring above mean 
come
Finally, we can determine whether any particular household member cohort is 
ecific 
nutritio
e 
tween 
responses to inco
 
(6) H : ii    
 H
32
A: ii 32    
 
 A rejection of the null hypothesis in (6) would indicate that individuals’ 
nutrition
in  versus those occurring below.  In this case the nested model in equation (1) 
would be inappropriate.  A failure to reject the null, on the other hand, indicates that 
individuals exhibit symmetrical nutritional responses and that equation (1) would 
suffice. 
 
better off than another by using Monte Carlo simulation methods on cohort-sp
nal values predicted by (2) to generate cohort-specific nutritional distributions 
which can then be analyzed using stochastic dominance methods.   
 
IV.  Dietary Diversity of Non-Head Household Members Relative to Heads 
When thinking about the intrahousehold allocation of nutrition, interest often 
focuses on how non-head household members fare relative to the household head.  W
use nonparametric regressions to generate an initial picture of the relationship be
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 the dietary diversity of non-heads and heads in these pastoralist households.  The 
intertemporal mean dietary diversity was calculated for each individual in the samp
That mean was then subtracted from each individual’s observed dietary diversity in 
each period.  This gave a measure of period-specific deviations from individual-
specific mean dietary diversity.  The de-meaned household-specific dietary diversi
of each non-head cohort (wi
le.  
ty 
ves, sons and daughters) was then regressed on the de-
meaned
 of 
ges in 
 indicate that the dietary diversity of non-head cohorts is 
perfect  
holds. 
These nonparametric regressions appear in Figures 1, 2 and 3, for wives, sons 
nd daughters, respectively.  What is immediately striking in these plots is how little 
correlation exists between changes in the dietary diversity of non-heads as compared 
to the heads. 
 
 
 
 
 household-specific dietary diversity of heads using a kernel-weighted local 
polynomial regression with a 95% confidence band.  As a reference, a 45-degree line 
depicting perfectly equitable intra-household dietary adjustments was overlaid on 
these non-parametric plots. 
The nonparametric regressions give some idea of how the dietary diversity
non-head cohorts changes with the dietary diversity of the head cohort.  If chan
the dietary diversity of non-head cohorts are perfectly correlated with changes in the 
head cohort’s dietary diversity, then the non-parametric regression should track the 
45-degree line.  On the other hand, a perfectly horizontal (at zero) nonparametric 
regression line would
ly unrelated to changes in the head cohort’s dietary diversity.  This would mean
that increases or decreases in the head’s dietary diversity, or whatever factors cause 
the head’s dietary diversity to change, do not affect the dietary diversity of non-heads 
in these house
a
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Figure 3.1:  Wife's Dietary Diversity Against Head’s Dietary Diversity 
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Figure 3.2:  Son’s Dietary Diversity Against Head’s Dietary Diversity 
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Figure 3.3:  Daughter’s Dietary Diversity Against Head’s Dietary Diversity 
 
 
Wives’ and adult sons’ dietary diversity appears statistically invariant for a loss 
of up to approximately 2 items in the household head’s dietary diversity —about 60% 
of mean dietary diversity.   In Figure 3, daughters’ dietary diversity appears 
statistically inelastic to negative changes in heads’ dietary diversity.  When heads 
consume above mean dietary diversity, all three non-head cohorts’ dietary diversity is 
significantly positively correlated to that of the head.  Thus, male household heads 
appear, at least unconditionally, to buffer their household members’ dietary diversity 
against negative deviations but share in dietary improvements.  If these results hold in 
multivariate regression analysis when controlling for potentially confounding factors, 
this indicates that during difficult times, non-head adult household members smooth 
consumption (dietary diversity) to a greater degree than do male household heads. 
There are (at least) two candidate explanations for this pattern. One is that 
during difficult times, male household heads, as the most experienced herders, spend 
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 more time herding at more remote locations, where food variety is especially limited.  
A second potential explanation is that during times of stress, the head consciously acts 
as a buffer for the rest of the family, reducing his own consumption to protect that of 
other family members.  Either or both of these explanations could account for why the 
pattern of intrahousehold allocation of dietary diversity differs depending on whether 
the household is consuming above or below their intertemporal mean.  Unfortunately, 
our data do not allow for explicit testing of either hypothesis. 
 
V. Estimation and Results 
 Turning now to the multivariate regression analysis, equation (2) is estimated 
using a random effects generalized least squares estimator.  Since the discrete nature 
of dietary diversity may cause heteroskedasticity, we employ White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity.  We test for symmetric nutritional responses to income changes 
above or below mean household income (hypothesis (6)) using a Wald test, both in the 
full sample and separately by wealth terciles. 
 
Results  
Full regression results appear in Table 3.  Overall, the estimation results make 
sense with the expected sign on most statistically significant coefficient estimates, the 
only exception being the coefficients on maize prices, which are discussed below. 
Outside of income and food prices, one the largest determinants of individual dietary 
diversity is the education of the household head.  The marginal effects of the head 
having some adult, primary or secondary education on the natural log of dietary  
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 Table 3.3 Full Regression Results 
***, ** and * significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively 
(###) p-value 
 Full Sample Lower Tercile Middle Tercile Upper Tercile 
Head 
(p-value) 
1.035*** 
(0.00) 
1.316** 
(0.02) 
0.206 
(0.75) 
0.073 
(0.91) 
Wife -0.245 
(0.30) 
-0.422 
(0.24) 
-0.173 
(0.63) 
0.044 
(0.93) 
Son 0.161 
(0.65) 
-0.207 
(0.68) 
0.307 
(0.60) 
0.745 
(0.38) 
Daughter 0.533 
(0.45) 
0.144 
(0.90) 
-0.370 
(0.84) 
2.416*** 
(0.01) 
ln(Income) 0.076*** 
(0.00) 
0.168*** 
(0.00) 
0.131** 
(0.02) 
0.137*** 
(0.01) 
Cohort-Specific Income Effects 
Head Above Mean -0.104*** 
(0.01) 
-0.146* 
(0.06) 
-0.204** 
(0.02) 
-0.130 
(0.15) 
Head Below Mean 0.008 
(0.75) 
-0.097** 
(0.05) 
-0.032 
(0.63) 
-0.076 
(0.20) 
Wife Above Mean 0.156*** 
(0.00) 
0.175* 
(0.08) 
0.150* 
(0.09) 
0.075 
(0.51) 
Wife Below Mean -0.062** 
(0.02) 
-0.027 
(0.67) 
-0.069* 
(0.10) 
-0.017 
(0.72) 
Son Above Mean 0.241*** 
(0.00) 
0.109 
(0.45) 
0.403*** 
(0.01) 
  0.235 
(0.16) 
Son Below Mean -0.047 
(0.37) 
0.020 
(0.85) 
-0.062 
(0.44) 
-0.059 
(0.51) 
Daughter Above Mean -0.008 
(0.94) 
-0.121 
(0.45) 
0.528* 
(0.09) 
-0.027 
(0.87) 
Daughter Below Mean -0.061 
(0.36) 
-0.143 
(0.46) 
-0.267** 
(0.02) 
0.066 
((0.23) 
Cohort Specific Price Effects 
Head Maize Price 0.130*** 
(0.00) 
  0.157*** 
(0.00) 
0.075 
(0.11) 
0.136** 
(0.02) 
Wife Maize Price -0.002 
(0.94) 
0.051 
(0.35) 
0.030 
(0.55) 
-0.042 
(0.54) 
Son Maize Price -0.035 
(0.46) 
0.026 
(0.76) 
-0.073 
(0.39) 
-0.018 
(0.85) 
Daughter Maize Price -0.013 
(0.87) 
-0.040 
(0.72) 
-0.011 
(0.94) 
0.291** 
(0.03) 
Head Tea Price -0.227*** 
(0.00) 
-0.553*** 
(0.00) 
-0.123 
(0.23) 
-0.057 
(0.63) 
Wife Tea Price 0.065 
(0.34) 
0.080 
(0.41) 
0.030 
(0.78) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
Son Tea Price -0.053 
(0.60) 
0.032 
(0.80) 
-0.059 
(0.75) 
-0.269 
(0.27) 
Daughter Tea Price -0.140 
(0.52) 
-0.010 
(0.98) 
0.085 
(0.88) 
-0.983*** 
(0.00) 
Age 0.0008 
(0.28) 
-0.0007 
(0.56) 
0.003* 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(0.50) 
Rainfall -0.0007** 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
0.00001 
(0.98) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
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 Table 3.3 (continued) 
 Full Sample Lower Tercile Middle Tercile Upper Tercile 
Adult Ed. 0.133*** 
(0.00) 
0.187*** 
(0.00) 
0.067 
(0.47) 
-0.057 
(0.60) 
Prim Ed 0.066*** 
(0.01) 
0.040 
(0.32) 
-0.020 
(0.76) 
0.066 
(0.12) 
Sec. Ed 0.173* 
(0.07) 
no observations 0.536*** 
(0.00) 
0.032 
(0.83) 
R2                                      within 0.034 3   0.0454 0.0359 0.0487 
between  0.8182 0.8646 0.8394 0.7291 
overall 0.5511 0.4765 0.5554 0.5584 
 
diversity are all statistically significant in the full sample regression with estimated 
values of 0.13, 0.07and 0.17, respectively.  In the lower tercile, the estimated effect of 
the head participating in an adult education or literacy program is statistically 
significant with an estimated magnitude of 0.19.  The effects of primary education are 
statistically insignificant in the lower wealth tercile and there are no households in this 
sub-sample where the head has received any secondary education.  In the middle 
tercile, the effect of the household head having received some secondary education is 
statistically significant and substantial with an estimated value of 0.54.  These results 
point to the importance of promoting continued education beyond primary school.  
Receiving primary school education alone appears to have a limited effect on the 
households’ dietary diversity.    In the upper tercile, the head’s education effects on 
dietary diversity are statistically insignificant in all three education categories.  Thus 
there appears to be decreasing marginal returns of having an educated household head 
to individuals’ dietary diversity. 
 Estimated intercepts for each household cohort in each regression sample are 
reported in Table 4.  As can be seen in Table 3, with one exception, none of the 
coefficients estimated for the cohort dummy variables (wife, son and daughter) are 
statistically different from zero in any of the samples.  Holding all else equal, the mean 
dietary diversity of a wife, adult son or adult daughter is not statistically different from 
that of the male household head.  The only exception is in the upper income tercile 
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 where the daughter’s mean dietary diversity is significantly greater than that of the 
head.  Among the wealthiest pastoralists, co-resident adult daughters appear relatively 
well fed. 
 
Intrahousehold Price Effects 
 Estimated price elasticities are reported in Table 4.  Estimated tea price 
elasticities using the full sample have the expected negative sign and are statistically 
significant for all four demographic cohorts with values ranging from –0.16 to -0.37.  
Estimated maize price elasticities on the other hand are positive.  Given the 
prominence of maize as a dietary staple in all of the study locations, the positive 
estimated elasticities likely reflect a substitution effect wherein rising maize prices 
cause individuals to decrease their consumption of this staple food and substitute for it 
with other foods.  Unless individuals completely eliminate maize from their diet, this 
substitution effect would cause dietary diversity to increase.  Interacting either maize 
or tea prices with the cohort-specific dummy variables produces no statistically 
significant effect on individual dietary diversity.  Therefore none of the price 
elasticities estimated for the non-head cohorts are statistically different from those 
estimated for heads.  These general patterns remain unchanged when estimating 
equation (2) in the income tercile sub-samples. 
 
Intrahousehold Income Effects 
 Estimated income elasticities for the full sample and for each of the income 
tercile sub-samples are also reported in Table 4.  What is immediately striking about 
these estimates is that the above mean income elasticity of dietary diversity for heads 
is not statistically different from zero in either the full sample or any of the three sub- 
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 Table 3.4: Cohort-Specific Estimated Intercepts and Income and Price Elasticities 
***, ** and * significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively 
(###) p-value 
 Head Wife Son Daughter 
Full Sample 
N 1449 1106 371 124 
Income Above Mean 
(p-value) 
-0.028 
(0.49) 
0.128*** 
(0.00) 
0.214*** 
(0.01) 
-0.036 
(0.73) 
Income Below Mean 0.084*** 
(0.00) 
0.022 
(0.29) 
0.037 
(0.46) 
0.023 
(0.72) 
Maize Price 0.130*** 
(0.00) 
0.128*** 
(0.00) 
0.096** 
(0.03) 
0.117 
(0.15) 
Tea Price -0.227*** 
(0.00) 
-0.163** 
(0.02) 
-0.280*** 
(0.01) 
-0.367** 
(0.09) 
Intercept 1.035*** 
(0.00) 
0.791*** 
(0.00) 
1.197*** 
(0.00) 
1.568** 
(0.03) 
Lower Tercile 
N 509 325 130 54 
Income Above Mean 0.022 
(0.11) 
0.197*** 
(0.01) 
0.132 
(0.30) 
-0.098 
(0.50) 
Income Below Mean 0.071** 
(0.05) 
0.044 
(0.41) 
0.090 
(0.37) 
-0.072 
(0.71) 
Maize Price 0.157*** 
(0.00) 
0.207*** 
(0.00) 
0.182** 
(0.02) 
0.116 
(0.31) 
Tea Price -0.553*** 
(0.00) 
-0.473*** 
(0.00) 
-0.521*** 
(0.00) 
-0.563* 
(0.08) 
Intercept 1.316** 
(0.02) 
0.894 
(0.12) 
1.109 
(0.12) 
1.461 
(0.23) 
Middle Tercile 
N 512 416 120 32 
Income Above Mean -0.073 
(0.27) 
0.077 
(0.20) 
0.330*** 
(0.01) 
0.455 
(0.13) 
Income Below Mean 0.099*** 
(0.00) 
0.031 
(0.31) 
0.037 
(0.63) 
-0.167 
(0.12) 
Maize Price 0.075 
(0.11) 
0.105** 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.99) 
0.064 
(0.68) 
Tea Price -0.123 
(0.23) 
-0.093 
(0.35) 
-0.182 
(0.34) 
-0.039 
(0.94) 
Intercept 0.205 
(0.75) 
0.032 
(0.96) 
0.513 
(0.55) 
-0.165 
(0.963) 
Upper Tercile 
N 428 365 121 38 
Income Above Mean 0.008 
(0.92) 
0.083 
(0.32) 
0.243* 
(0.10) 
-0.019 
(0.89) 
Income Below Mean 0.061** 
(0.04) 
0.045 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
0.128*** 
(0.01) 
Maize Price 0.136** 
(0.02) 
0.094 
(0.13) 
0.118 
(0.20) 
0.428*** 
(0.00) 
Tea Price -0.057 
(0.63) 
-0.053 
(0.67) 
-0.326 
(0.17) 
-1.040*** 
(0.00) 
Intercept 0.073 
(0.91) 
0.118 
(0.85) 
0.818 
(0.40) 
2.489*** 
(0.01) 
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samples, while heads’ below mean income elasticity is statistically significant in all of 
the sub-samples as well as in the full sample.  Conversely, the below mean income 
elasticity is not statistically different from zero for wives or sons in any of the 
samples.  The above mean income elasticity is statistically significant in the full 
sample and middle and upper tercile for sons and in the full sample and lower tercile 
for wives.  Daughters’ above mean income elasticity is not statistically significant in 
any of the samples and their below mean income elasticity is only statistically 
significant in the upper tercile. 
 Using the full sample, the above mean income elasticity is not statistically 
significantly different from zero for household heads or daughters, while it is for 
wives and sons with values of 0.13 and 0.21, respectively.  On the other hand, the 
below mean income elasticity is not statistically significant for wives, sons or 
daughters, while it is for heads with a value of 0.08.  Thus there appears to be 
significant differences in the cohort-specific income elasticity estimates depending on 
whether income changes occur when household income is above or below the 
household’s intertemporal mean.  A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric 
responses to changes in income above and below the household mean with a test 
statistic of (4) = 10.93 and a p-value of 0.027.  This means that individuals’ dietary 
diversity responds differently to income changes occurring above and below the 
household’s intertemporal mean. 
 These results imply that wives and adult sons enjoy some nutritional rewards 
when household income is high relative to the household’s intertemporal mean, but 
during more difficult times, male household heads’ dietary diversity falls, allowing 
wives, sons and daughters to maintain their dietary patterns.  Co-resident adult 
daughters appear to have the most stable diets, with their dietary diversity effectively 
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 invariant to fluctuations in household income.  However, the relatively small number 
of daughters in the data sample may lead to insufficiently precise parameter estimates 
to clearly identify the income effects on their dietary diversity.   
Estimating equation (2) within household income terciles does not 
meaningfully change any of these results.  Household heads generally appear to bear 
the dietary diversity brunt of below mean income, buffering their wives and adult 
children, who appear to enjoy the dietary diversity gains associated with above mean 
income.  However, in higher income terciles the differences across cohorts in dietary 
diversity response to above mean income changes appears to decrease.  The only 
exception to this general pattern is daughters in the upper tercile.  In addition to heads, 
daughters in the upper tercile also have statistically significant estimated below mean 
income elasticities.  Daughters in the upper tercile are also substantially more price 
and below mean income elastic than any of the other cohorts. 
The results of the parametric estimation thus corroborate the nonparametric 
regressions in Figures 1-3.  When household income falls below its intertemporal 
mean, the household head adjusts his dietary diversity more than do other household 
members.  However, unlike the nonparametric regressions, multivariate analysis 
indicates that when the household experiences more favorable income draws, wives’ 
and sons’ dietary diversity increases more with changes in income than does heads’.  
These effects are most pronounced among the poorest households and diminish in 
higher income households. 
Returning to the potential explanations posited earlier, if the results were 
driven by male household heads’ undertaking long treks to remote areas with low 
dietary diversity supply during tough times, then we would also expect to see 
estimated below mean income elasticities for adult sons following a similar pattern, 
since herding is primarily the responsibility of adult (or teenage) sons.  It is unlikely 
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 that sons would remain behind with the family’s women and children while the father 
takes the herds to distant grazing areas.  The fact that sons do not exhibit similar 
responses to changes in below mean income to those of heads favors the head-as-
buffer explanation of these results.  But we again emphasize that we cannot directly 
test this hypothesis in these data. 
 
VI.  Intrahousehold Welfare Orderings 
 The possibility that household heads buffer their family members against 
negative fluctuations in consumption naturally raises questions about the stochastic 
distribution of dietary diversity across demographic cohorts.  Although there are, for 
the most part, no statistically significant differences in mean dietary diversity among 
demographic cohorts (see the cohort-intercept interaction estimates in Table 3), the 
cross-cohort differences in dietary response to income shocks raises the possibility of 
discernible welfare orderings among risk averse agents. 
 Toward that end, we now investigate such welfare orderings.  First, we 
simulate cohort-specific dietary diversity distributions.  We then conduct tests for 
stochastic dominance among demographic cohorts.  We also use the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (WMW) rank-sum test for equality among the simulated cohort-specific 
dietary diversity distributions to estimate the probability that a random draw from one 
cohort-specific distribution is greater than that from another (Mann and Whitney 1947, 
Wilcoxon 1945)46. 
                                                 
46  The WMW rank-sum test tests the hypothesis that two independent samples (e.g. the heads’ and 
wives’ dietary diversity pseudo-distributions) come from populations with the same distribution.  The 
rank-sum procedure can then be used to calculate the probability that a random draw from the first 
sample is greater than that from the second sample by taking all possible pairs between the two samples 
and asking in what percent of those pairs is the draw from the first sample greater than that from the 
second. 
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  From each of the four different estimations of (2)—the full sample and three 
income tercile sub-samples—we captured cohort-specific vectors of residuals and 
predicted dietary diversity values.  We then drew 10,000 randomly sampled 
observations from each of these vectors to create simulated cohort-specific residual 
( ) and predicted dietary diversity ( ) vectors, which we then summed to 
generate cohort-specific dietary diversity pseudo-distributions.  We then computed the 
resulting cohort-specific cumulative distributions and tested for first-, second-, and 
third-degree stochastic dominance among the cohort-specific dietary diversity pseudo-
distributions to establish whether any welfare orderings could be made under 
reasonable assumptions about individual preferences over dietary diversity. 
c
ihvt cihvtNˆln
 The results of the WMW test and corresponding estimated probabilities are 
reported in Table 5.  The WMW test rejects the equality of cohort-specific dietary 
diversity distributions among all cohorts in all four samples.  The equality of cohort- 
specific distributions is rejected at the five percent level for heads and wives in the 
lower tercile and at the one percent level for all other cohort pairs in all four samples.  
While the all the cohort-specific distributions are statistically significantly different 
from each other some of them are not substantively different.  For example, although 
the cohort-specific distributions of wives and heads are statistically different from 
each other in all four samples, the probability that a random draw from the heads’ 
distributions is greater than that from the wives distributions ranges from 0.473-0.517 
(if the distributions were equal we would expect these probabilities to be 0.50).  So 
although the WMW test shows wives to be statistically significantly better off than 
heads in the full sample and lower and middle tercile, the calculated probabilities 
show the welfare of the two cohorts to be broadly equal. 
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 Table 3.5:  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test Results (Probability that a random draw 
from row distribution is greater than that from column distribution) 
 
*** and ** indicate that the row distribution is significantly different from the column 
distribution at the one and five percent-level, respectively 
 Wife Son Daughter 
Full Sample    
Head 0.488*** 0.588*** 0.466*** 
Wife  0.600*** 0.477*** 
Son   0.379*** 
Lower Tercile    
Head 0.492** 0.559*** 0.378*** 
Wife  0.566*** 0.387*** 
Son   0.323*** 
Middle Tercile    
Head 0.473*** 0.596*** 0.527*** 
Wife  0.623*** 0.553*** 
Son   0.436*** 
Upper Tercile    
Head 0.517*** 0.626*** 0.485*** 
Wife  0.614*** 0.466*** 
Son   0.354*** 
 
 
Since the differences between cohort-specific dietary diversity distributions are 
statistically significant, we then explore whether welfare orderings can be established 
among them.  For this, we use stochastic dominance methods (Whitmore and Findlay 
1978).  Stochastic dominance test results are reported in Table 6; the cumulative 
distributions are plotted in Figures 4-7.  No stochastic dominance orderings exist 
between heads and wives in either the full sample or the lower tercile.  In the middle 
tercile wives stochastically dominate heads in the second-degree whereas in the upper 
tercile heads stochastically dominate wives in the second degree.  Looking at the 
cumulative distributions, however, the welfare of heads and wives seem broadly 
similar as reflected in dietary diversity measures.  Thus while distributional 
dominance exists in all four samples between heads and wives, there appears to be 
little substantive difference between the two cohorts’ welfare.  This is consistent with  
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Table 3.6:  Stochastic Dominance Between Intrahousehold Dietary Diversity 
Distributions (Dominance of Row Distribution over Column Distribution) 
 
FSD:  First Degree Stochastic Dominance of column distribution by row distribution 
SSD:  Second Degree Stochastic Dominance of column distribution by row distribution 
 Head Wife Son Daughter 
Full Sample     
Head X No FSD No 
Wife No X FSD No 
Son No No X No 
Daughter SSD SSD SSD X 
Lower Tercile     
Head X No SSD No 
Wife No X FSD No 
Son No No X No 
Daughter SSD SSD FSD X 
Middle Tercile     
Head X No FSD No 
Wife SSD X FSD No 
Son No No X No 
Daughter No No FSD X 
Upper Tercile     
Head X SSD FSD No 
Wife No X FSD No 
Son No No X No 
Daughter SSD SSD SSD X 
 
the observation in Table 5 that the probability a random draw from the heads’ pseudo-
distribution will be greater than that from the wives’ is always around 50 percent 
despite the statistically significant difference between the two cohorts’ distributions. 
Daughters enjoy either first- or second-degree stochastic dominance over 
heads, wives and sons in the full sample and in all sub- samples except the middle 
tercile.  In the middle tercile daughters stochastically dominate sons in the first-degree 
but no stochastic dominance orderings exist between daughters and heads or wives.  
The probability that a random draw from the heads’ and wives’ distributions will be 
greater that than from the daughters’ ranges from 0.378-0.485 and 0.387-0.466, 
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 respectively, across the full sample and the lower and upper terciles.  In the middle 
tercile these probabilities are 0.527 and 0.553, respectively. 
 In contrast, heads, wives and daughters all enjoy either first- or second-degree 
stochastic dominance over sons in all four samples.  The probability that a random 
draw from the heads’ and wives’ distributions will be greater than the sons’ ranges 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 P
op
ul
at
io
n
-1 0 1 2 3
LN (Dietary Diversity)
Head Wife
Son Daughter
 
Figure 3.4:  Cumulative Distribution of Four Cohorts in Full Sample 
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Figure 3.5:  Cumulative Distribution of Four Cohorts in Lower Tercile 
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Figure 3.6:  Cumulative Distribution of Four Cohorts in Middle Tercile 
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Figure 3.7:  Cumulative Distribution of Four Cohorts in Upper Tercile 
 
from 0.559-0.626 and 0.566-0.623, respectively.  Even more striking, the probability 
that a random draw from any of the four daughter-specific distributions will be greater 
than that from the corresponding son-specific distribution ranges from 0.564-0.677.47 
 Sons’ lower dietary diversity than heads, wives and daughters likely results, in 
part, from their herding responsibilities.  While herding, sons have less access to a 
diverse diet than do those who remain at home.  Note that this does not necessarily 
mean that sons consume less food than do other household members, only that they 
enjoy less diversity in what they eat.  Nonetheless, if people value dietary diversity, 
then adult sons are systematically worse off than their fathers, mothers or adult sisters 
in the east African pastoralist households we study. 
                                                 
47 Table 5 reports probabilities that a random draw from the sons’ distribution is greater than that from 
the daughters’ distribution.  The complement, that a random draw from the daughters’ distribution is 
greater than that from the sons’ is calculated by subtracting the reported probabilities from one. 
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  Conversely, daughters appear to enjoy some measure of favoritism.  This may 
be due to the practice of bride payments in these communities.  Adult daughters still 
living in their parents’ home are unlikely to be married.  When they do marry their 
families normally receive a bride price.  Healthier and more educated daughters often 
fetch higher payments.  Thus daughters’ health may have added value above and 
beyond that which is due to their inherent value as a family member.  This may 
explain why daughters appear to enjoy somewhat greater dietary diversity than do 
other household members. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
The mixed evidence pertaining to intrahousehold inequality points to an 
inherent danger in assuming a priori the existence, or lack thereof, of behavioral or 
welfare disparities within the household.  Misunderstanding this essential component 
of resource allocation can have potentially serious implications for the welfare impacts 
of development programs and policies.  If nutritional inequality is assumed to exist 
where it does not, or assumed not to exist where it does, development policies and 
programs may have unintended effects.  Understanding how different groups respond 
to changes in household income is essential to well-targeted programs concerned with 
nutritional outcomes, particularly among the poorest households. 
Some studies have previously studied intrahousehold resource allocation by 
comparing the estimated price and income elasticities of different demographic groups 
within the household.  Certainly, knowing how individuals’ resource consumption 
responds to changes in prices and income provides important information on the 
potential welfare impacts of development policies.  However, comparing individual 
elasticities does not necessarily provide a better understanding of possible welfare 
disparities within the household.  A relatively high income (price) elasticity has 
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positive welfare implications when income (prices) is increasing (decreasing) and 
negative welfare implications when income (prices) is decreasing (increasing).  
Therefore knowing individual elasticities without knowledge of the direction of price 
or income changes does not allow for any definitive welfare comparisons. 
We therefore estimated cohort-specific income elasticities of nutritional 
welfare separately for income changes above and below the households’ intertemporal 
mean income.  If household income is above its mean, having a higher estimated 
income elasticity is beneficial.  Conversely, if household income is below its mean, a 
higher estimated elasticity is undesirable. 
Among the east African pastoralist households we study, the dietary diversity 
of household heads exhibits statistically significant responses to below mean income 
changes and appears unresponsive to above-mean changes in income.  In contrast, 
wives’ and sons’ dietary diversity is unresponsive to changes in below-mean income 
but sometimes statistically significantly responsive to changes in above-mean income.  
Daughters’ dietary diversity is relatively stable in the face of fluctuations in household 
income.  Thus, for the most part, negative dietary diversity responses to changes in 
income are experienced disproportionately by household heads while positive changes 
are experienced disproportionately by other household members.   
Investigating further using cohort-specific stochastic dominance tests, we find 
that that sons are systematically worse off than other household members in terms of 
dietary diversity while daughters are systematically better off.  This difference seems 
to reflect sons’ primary occupation in herding away from towns, thereby limiting their 
access to diverse diets, and daughters’ value given bride sale customs among these 
peoples.  Within these pastoralist communities, although dietary diversity is uniformly 
low, female household members appear to fare no worse than males. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: Full Regression Results from Disaggregated Income Model 
 Full Sample Milk Sale Sub-
Sample 
Single Adult Sub-
Sample 
N 2089 311 508 
Number of Groups 318 127 75 
Trade & Business 0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Trade & Business, Middle Tercile -0.016* 
(0.008) 
  
Trade & Business, Upper Tercile -0.008 
(0.007) 
  
Wages & Salary 0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Wages & Salary, Middle Tercile 0.002 
(0.009) 
  
Wages & Salary, Upper Tercile -0.0001 
(0.008) 
  
Livestock Trade 0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Livestock Trade, Middle Tercile -0.005 
(0.007) 
  
Livestock Trade, Upper Tercile -0.013** 
(0.006) 
  
Livestock Products 0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
Livestock Products, Middle Tercile -0.002 
(0.007) 
  
Livestock Products, Upper Tercile -0.006 
(0.007) 
  
Crop Value -0.025** 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
Crop Value, Middle Tercile 0.045*** 
(0.015) 
  
Crop Value, Upper Tercile 0.032** 
(0.016) 
  
Remittances 0.011 
(0.007) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Remittances, Middle Tercile 0.014 
(0.010) 
  
Remittances, Upper Tercile 0.002 
(0.009) 
  
Tea Price -0.209*** 
(0.067) 
-0.077 
(0.098) 
-0.247** 
(0.122) 
Tea Price, Middle Tercile -0.128 
(0.087) 
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  Full Sample Milk Sale Sub-
Sample 
Single Adult Sub-
Sample 
Tea Price, Upper Tercile 0.117 
(0.091) 
  
Maize Price 0.060 
(0.058) 
-0.094 
(0.100) 
0.081 
(0.068) 
Maize Price, Middle Tercile -0.031 
(0.066) 
  
Maize Price, Upper Tercile 0.031 
(0.067) 
  
March 0.033 
(0.027) 
 0.143*** 
(0.054) 
June 0.021 
(0.024) 
 0.133*** 
(0.049) 
September -0.013 
(0.025) 
 0.090* 
(0.051) 
Household Size 0.0009 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
Male -0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.004 
(0.047) 
0.168* 
(0.104) 
Age 0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Average Rainfall -0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
Adult Education 0.084* 
(0.049) 
0.119 
(0.085) 
0.335*** 
(0.058) 
Primary School 0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.106 
(0.092) 
0.181** 
(0.092) 
Secondary School 0.216** 
(0.089) 
no observations no observations 
Middle Tercile 0.403 
(0.310) 
-0.116* 
(0.069) 
-0.074 
(0.053) 
Upper Tercile -0.415 
(0.324) 
0.019 
(0.092) 
-0.068 
(0.076) 
Constant 1.235*** 
(0.252) 
1.144*** 
(0.431) 
1.406*** 
(0.477) 
R2                   within 0.0381 0.0646 0.0521 
between 0.8081 0.6382 0.8484 
overall 0.5100 0.5295 0.5419 
***, ** and * significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively 
(###)  standard error 
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Table A2: Full Regression Results from Aggregated Income Model 
 Full Sample Milk Sales Sub-
Sample 
Single Adult Sub-
Sample 
N 2089 311 508 
Number of Groups 318 127 75 
Total Income 0.072*** 
(0.021) 
0.043 
(0.027) 
0.054*** 
(0.021) 
Total Income, Middle Tercile -0.009 
(0.026) 
  
Total Income, Upper Tercile -0.037 
(0.026) 
  
Tea Price -0.238*** 
(0.062) 
0.018 
(0.093) 
-0.254** 
(0.121) 
Tea Price, Middle Tercile -0.032 
(0.081) 
  
Tea Price, Upper Tercile 0.163* 
(0.088) 
  
Maize Price 0.105* 
(0.054) 
-0.084 
(0.102) 
0.083 
(0.064) 
Maize Price, Middle Tercile -0.029 
(0.056) 
  
Maize Price, Upper Tercile 0.017 
(0.059) 
  
March 0.035 
(0.026) 
 0.154*** 
(0.052) 
June 0.021 
(0.024) 
 0.133*** 
(0.048) 
September 0.001 
(0.025) 
 0.103** 
(0.050) 
Household Size -0.0006 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
Male -0.027 
(0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.047) 
0.207* 
(0.108) 
Age 0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Average Rainfall -0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
Adult Education 0.084* 
(0.050) 
0.122 
(0.084) 
0.354*** 
(0.061) 
Primary School 0.097*** 
(0.034) 
0.091 
(0.098) 
0.179* 
(0.094) 
Secondary School 0.212** 
(0.091) 
no observations no observations 
Middle Tercile 0.204 
(0.350) 
-0.130* 
(0.069) 
-0.108** 
(0.051) 
Upper Tercile -0.289 
(0.373) 
-0.008 
(0.095) 
-0.097 
(0.080) 
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 Full Sample Milk Sales Sub-
Sample 
Single Adult Sub-
Sample 
  
Constant 0.771*** 
(0.263) 
0.483 
(0.444) 
1.002** 
(0.494) 
R2                   within 0.0286 0.0402 0.0524 
between 0.8007 0.6276 0.8354 
overall 0.5029 0.5146 0.5376 
***, ** and * significant at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively 
(###)  standard error 
 
 
 
 
